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Notes
SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST: FEDERAL LAW
V. STATE LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
I. INTRODUCTION
A land ethic for tomorrow should be as honest as Thoreau’s Walden, and as
comprehensive as the sensitive science of ecology. It should stress the oneness of
our resources and the live-and-help-live logic of the great chain of life.1
Assume that in order to attract industry and build a more robust
economy, State X, in 1998, enacted lenient laws dealing with successor
liability in corporate liability cases. Now assume that in 1960, John
Smith, a chemist, chose to start a hazardous chemical manufacturing
plant in State X and that Mr. Smith incorporated his business under the
laws of State X. Due to an increased industrial interest in chemical
research in the 1990s, Mr. Smith’s company had enough business in State
Y that he built a second facility there in 1992, also manufacturing
hazardous chemicals. State Y has more stringent corporate liability laws
than State X. Unbeknownst to Mr. Smith and his managers, a large
amount of hazardous residue accumulated in both of his facilities and
leaked into the soil beneath his hazardous chemical manufacturing
plants.
In 2004, following a large corporate buyout in 2000 under the laws of
State Y, Mr. Smith sold his facilities, all assets of the company, and the
patents to processing the chemicals to E Corp., a company incorporated
under the laws of State Y. E Corp. then decided to relocate the chemical
facilities and build apartments on both facilities’ sites. In 2005, Mr. Smith
died. Pursuant to the proposed change in the use of land from industrial
to residential, the bank from which E Corp. sought to obtain a loan
demanded that E Corp. perform Phase I and Phase II Environmental
Assessments of the property. As can be imagined, groundwater tests
indicated that the water had been contaminated from the accumulated
residue in both facilities.
Pursuant to federal regulation, the
environmental consultants reported the contamination to the
appropriate agencies. Following the government’s clean-up of the sites
in both States X and Y, they now seek reimbursement from E Corp. as a
1

STEWART L. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS 190 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1963).
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successor corporation to Smith. E Corp. denies that it is a successor in
interest to Mr. Smith’s facilities, and the government sues in federal
court seeking to enforce the repayment of clean-up costs. The federal
court is now faced with the question of whether to apply federal or state
law in the case, and if state law is chosen, whether to apply the law of
State X or of State Y.2
Foremost among the issues for E Corp. is determining whether it is a
liable party in Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) violations; this is more commonly
referred to as the issue of successor liability.3 Federal circuits are split as
to whether to apply state law or federal law in resolving the issue.4
Therefore, the purpose of this Note is to explore various arguments
promoting the application of state law and promoting the application of
federal common law, and to advocate the creation and adoption of a
uniform federal rule to resolve the issue of successor liability. Part II of
this Note outlines the background of the statute and the circuit split
regarding which law should govern.5 Part III analyzes two different
approaches circuits have taken to resolve the issue—the application of
state law and the application of federally developed common law.6 Part
IV proposes three different methods by which the issue of successor
liability could potentially be addressed: a statutory amendment to
CERCLA, statutory construction by the Supreme Court to define the
meaning of “successor corporation,” or the Court’s creation of federal
common law to define how a successor corporation is to be determined
for purposes of liability.7

2
The foregoing hypothetical is entirely the creation of the author and completely
fictional. Any resemblance of this hypothetical to real persons, entities, or facts is purely
coincidental.
3
Jay W. Warren, Comment, The Choice of Law Issue for Corporate Successor Liability Under
CERCLA in N. Shore Gas Co. v. Salmon, Inc.: Another Opinion Sidesteps the Issue, 16 J. NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 321 (2001–02); see also infra Part II.A (discussing the issue of
determining who is a liable party under CERCLA).
4
See infra Parts II.B–E (discussing the circuit split and various arguments for
application of state law and federal law).
5
See infra Part II (discussing how the hasty formulation of CERCLA has led to litigation
concerning how a successor corporation is to be determined for purposes of liability under
CERCLA, and also explaining the opposing approaches circuits have applied in seeking to
resolve the issue).
6
See infra Part III (analyzing the superiority and utility of applying federal common law
to the less useful approach of applying state law to resolve issues of successor liability).
7
See infra Part IV (suggesting one of three approaches to resolve the issue, and
discussing why the creation of federal common law is the most likely way to resolve the
problem).
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II. BACKGROUND OF STATUTORY, JUDICIAL, AND SCHOLARLY RESPONSES TO
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
In the 1960s and 1970s, many acts of legislation were passed in order
to combat the burgeoning concern over the danger to human health and
the environment caused by hazardous pollutants.8 Some of these acts
included the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) of 1976.9 RCRA created what
has been called a “cradle-to-grave” system for facilitating the use of
hazardous substances in society—from the time of their introduction to
their disposal.10 Through RCRA, Congress had resolved concerns
regarding the life cycle of hazardous substances.11 However, following
RCRA’s enactment, a new concern came to Congress’s attention—the
“inactive hazardous waste site problem.”12
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6120.
Id. See also DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
528, 648, 788 (Thomson West 2006) (1981). Beginning in 1955, the federal government
began to regulate air pollution through the Air Pollution Control Act. Id. at 529. This
legislation largely tried to help states curb air pollution by providing research and technical
support in addition to financial aid. Id. Due to this legislation’s ineffectiveness, Congress
enacted the Clean Air Act in 1970, which sought to curb pollution through setting National
Ambient Air Quality Standards for the states. Id. The states were then required to achieve
the air quality standards by a statutory deadline. Id.
The federal government sought to regulate water pollution as early as 1899; however,
the government played only a minor role until after World War II. Id. at 646. Despite
efforts to further police water pollution throughout the 1950s and 1960s, water pollution
continued. Id. During this time, the public’s awareness of water pollution’s danger began
to grow. Id. at 646–47. Finally, in 1972, Congress amended its previous water quality
statutes and renamed the legislation the Clean Water Act. Congress’s new policing
mechanism to control water quality included a national permit system for all “point
sources” of water pollution and sanctions for those that have no permit, as well as those
permit holders who do not achieve mandated water quality standards. Id. at 648. In
creating RCRA, Congress amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act, which was first enacted
in 1965, to regulate landfills and dumps. Id. at 788. RCRA was established as Congress
became more aware of toxic substances that were leaching into the groundwater,
subsequently causing threats to human health and the environment. Id.
10
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 17; see also FARBER ET AL., supra note 9, at 790 (“RCRA is
designed to provide ‘cradle to grave’ coverage for a large percentage of the hazardous
waste generated by businesses and government. The statute covers approximately 30
million tons of hazardous wastes generated annually by more than 17,000 generators.”).
11
See id. (“RCRA’s overarching theory is that if we know where the waste is during its
life cycle—from the moment of generation through transport to a disposal site, to its
ultimate treatment, storage and disposal—then we can avoid the kinds of catastrophes at
which CERCLA is aimed.”).
12
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 17; see also FARBER ET AL., supra note 9, at 788. The authors
explained the growing issue as follows:
Not long after RCRA’s passage, the issue of hazardous waste
contamination made national headlines. In August 1978, President
8
9
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In 1979, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) determined
that between 30,000 and 50,000 inactive and uncontrolled hazardous
substance waste sites existed.13 This “inactive and hazardous waste site
problem[]” was evident throughout the United States with 1,200–2,000

Carter declared a state of emergency in the Love Canal area of Niagara
Falls, New York. Investigating serious health complaints by residents,
the state health department found that toxic chemicals had leaked into
the basements of many houses, and into the air, water, and soil. . . . In
1947, Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporations had purchased an
uncompleted waterway and used it as a depository for an estimated
352 million pounds of industrial wastes over the following six years.
The land had then been used as a school site and a housing
development. As a result, three decades later, over 1000 families were
evacuated, $30 million in cleanup costs were required, and over $3
billion in damage claims were filed.
Love Canal was not an isolated incident. In the past, land was
regarded as a “safe” repository for wastes that could not be disposed
of in the air or water. Decades of uncontrolled dumping have led to
contamination of land and of related ground and surface waters.
Id. at 788–89 (footnote omitted). An even greater problem that began to gain recognition
was that water traveling through these sites could carry chemicals into the groundwater,
thereby contaminating streams, rivers, and other sources of water. Id. at 788. The Love
Canal incident created an increased urgency in Congress to pass CERCLA. Id.
13
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 18 (explaining that “findings of the Committee’s Oversight
Subcommittee clearly and unequivocally document the nature and magnitude of the
problem and the inadequacy of existing law to properly control it.”). The House Report
then went on to report an illustrative list of findings that the Committee considered in
creating the proposed Act. Under CERCLA, “hazardous substance” is defined as:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title
33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance
designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous
waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to
section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act . . . (D) any toxic
pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air
pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or
mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action
pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include
petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not
otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance
under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term
does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas,
or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such
synthetic gas).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2000). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted the statute
to include any hazardous substance, and the statute does not have specific quantitative
requirements, but includes even minimal amounts of pollution. United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 720 (2nd Cir. 1993).
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sites recognized as posing serious public health risks.14 In addition to the
presence of sites with heightened risk, the problem also included
inadequate measures by local and state governments to combat public
health threats.15 Furthermore, some of the hazardous waste sites had
already contaminated drinking water supplies, thereby damaging
human health and the environment; indeed, this contamination caused
great public concern.16
In response, the public became more curious and concerned about
past disposal of hazardous waste that had created present consequences.17
Thus, while RCRA was primarily forward-looking in its scope, Congress
sought to enact backward-looking legislation that addressed problems
created by the past disposal of hazardous substances.18 Consequently,
Congress drafted CERCLA.19 Unfortunately, in their eagerness to pass a

See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 17, 20, 25 (explaining that the failure of entities to dispose
properly of hazardous waste is costing the public millions of dollars in clean-up and that
the danger to the environment and the public health is substantial); Ronald G. Aronovsky
& Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Substance Releases Under
CERCLA, 24 U.S.F. L. REV. 421, 425 (1990) (explaining that abandoned hazardous waste
sites had already damaged the environment and human health); see also 126 CONG. REC.
H31,968 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Florio) (“It should be made clear that
without this legislation there is a huge legislative void that exists. There is no authority.
There is no funding to deal with certain types of hazardous waste spills and hazardous
waste dangers to health and to the environment.”) (emphasis added).
15
See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 18–19 for a list of specific examples that posed a
significant threat to public health. The following are just three of the examples included in
the House report:
At Lathrop, California, pesticide formulation waste products
placed in lagoons were allowed to percolate into the extremely
permeable soil, threatening the area’s drinking and irrigation water.
. . . In Central Florida, hundreds of homes were built on land covered
with waste containing radium and thorium from old phosphate
operations; unhealthy levels of radon gas have been found in
hundreds of homes. . . .
....
The New York State Health Department has failed to assure residents
of the Love Canal that the public health is being adequately protected.
Id. at 19–20.
16
See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 14, at 425 (explaining that CERCLA was passed as
a result of numerous widely publicized discoveries of abandoned hazardous waste sites).
17
Id. at 17–18. (“The unfortunate human health and environmental consequence of
these practices has received national attention amidst growing public and Congressional
concern over the magnitude of the problem and the appropriate course of response that
should be pursued. Existing law is clearly inadequate to deal with this massive problem.”).
18
Id.
19
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 1, 17; see also 126 CONG. REC. H31,968 (statement of Rep.
Florio) (“The overriding majority of the people in this House who passed it and the people
who passed it in the other body were responding to the pressure from this Nation to
14
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law that would address the hazardous waste site problem, members of
Congress drafted a law with numerous statutory deficiencies recognized
by both those members of Congress in favor of the legislation and those
who opposed it.20 As a result of the hasty enactment of CERCLA, a
multitude of courts has spent countless resources seeking to resolve
issues in the Act.21
This Part begins with a discussion of CERCLA’s legislative history in
Part II.A, including a discussion of the Act’s basic purposes and
Congress’s intent in enacting it.22 Part II.B examines the authority
provide for a remedial action for the problem of abandoned hazardous waste sites and
chemical spills.”).
20
In the House debate concerning CERCLA’s passage, many representatives strongly
supported it despite its recognized flaws, and many strongly opposed its enactment.
Compare id. at H31,968-69 (statement of Rep. Florio):
Let me just conclude by giving to you my impression that this is a
good bill and those of us who overwhelmingly supported this bill
when it came before the House can be happy to support it
now. . . . There will be those who say that the bill is not perfect. Of
course it is not. There will be those who say that we could do more
and we could[] . . . . The time is now to deal with this problem. . . . The
concern is whether we are going to have legislation . . . . Accordingly, I
would ask for your support for this bill . . . so that we can have this
bill sent to the President and have it signed into law.
with id. at H31,971 (statement of Rep. Madigan) (emphasis added):
[T]here are some very serious flaws in this bill as passed by the Senate.
It would have made much more sense for me to take the time to correct
technical errors and to address a few of the policy concerns that are
shared by Members of the House . . . . However, that was not the
course of action chosen by my chairman, the chairman of my
subcommittee . . . . We have been left at a take-it-or-leave it situation
and I rise to recommend to the House that we leave it.
and id. at H31,969 (statement of Rep. Broyhill):
I . . . urge the House to defeat this motion to suspend the rules and to
pass this legislation. . . . it seems to me that we are being asked here to
pass a bill that has dozens of defects in it when all we would have to
do is to add reasonable amendments and send that back to the other
body and have them pass a bill that will be administratively workable.
. . . I have in my hand a three-page list of various defects and technical
errors that are in this bill . . . . Here is a list of serious and technical
problems with this bill. . . . Inadequate drafting.—This bill was
hurriedly drafted without the use of legislative counsel and as [a]
result contains a large but unknown number of drafting errors.
Id.
21
Warren, supra note 3, at 321 (“Numerous issues in the Act have spawned litigation
since its passage, but none, perhaps, as crucial as the determination of exactly who should
be held liable for CERCLA violations. Despite its comprehensive nature, CERCLA fails to
expressly address the liability of successor parent corporations for violations of
subsidiaries.”).
22
See infra Part II.A (discussing Congress’s intent for enacting the CERCLA and some of
the Act’s deficiencies noted by Congress).
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delegated to the EPA under the Act to determine responsible parties and
steps necessary to clean up hazardous waste sites.23 This Part also
focuses on factors the Supreme Court has fashioned to help determine
when it is appropriate to draft federal common law.24 Part II.C
introduces CERCLA’s deficiency that is at issue in this Note—the issue
of successor liability—and discusses different approaches state and
federal courts have used to resolve the problem.25 Finally, Parts II.D and
II.E present the circuit split that now plagues the federal circuits,
specifically whether state or federal law should govern when defining a
successor corporation for purposes of liability under CERCLA.26
A. Hasty Statutory Formulation for an Extensive Problem: CERCLA
CERCLA, also known as Superfund,27 was hastily enacted in 1980,
was signed into law at the end of the Carter administration,28 and had
essentially two purposes: 1) to enable the EPA’s Administrator to
pursue prompt recovery costs from parties financially responsible and
liable for clean-up activities and 2) to identify and remediate
contaminated sites.29 To meet these objectives, Congress created
See infra Part II.C (examining the responsibilities of the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) under CERCLA and the public’s criticisms of CERCLA).
24
See infra Part II.D (focusing on the authority of courts to draft federal common law and
on factors created by the Supreme Court to help determine when federal common law is
necessary and appropriate).
25
See infra Part II.B (introducing the issue of successor liability and the “mere
continuation” and “substantial continuity” tests).
26
See infra Parts II.D–II.E (presenting opposing arguments among the federal circuits as
to whether state law should govern the issue of successor liability, or whether federal
courts should create federal common law to resolve the issue).
27
JOHN S. APPLEGATE & JAN G. LAITOS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: RCRA, CERCLA, AND
THE MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 133 (Foundation Press 2006). Superfund is a
trust fund that receives funding from excise taxes on companies like chemical and
petroleum industries. Id. The money in Superfund is used to finance clean-up activities of
non-liable private parties. Id. To help determine which sites can access Superfund money
under CERCLA, the EPA creates a list of the worst hazardous waste sites in the nation, and
the EPA places these sites on a National Priorities List. Id. Through this list and other
methods, the EPA can determine what corrective actions need to be taken to clean up
hazardous waste sites, and the EPA is able to decide how the government and private
parties can recover the costs of the clean-up. Id. at 134.
28
MICHAEL B. GERRARD & JOEL M. GROSS, AMENDING CERCLA: THE POST-SARA
AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND
LIABILITY ACT 1 (2006).
29
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6120; see, e.g.,
Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 14, at 421 (“In 1980, CONGRESS ENACTED [CERCLA] as a
hurried measure to address the emerging problem associated with the cost of cleaning up
the nation’s hundreds of leaking hazardous waste disposal sites.”) (footnote omitted); see
also Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991);
APPLEGATE & LAITOS, supra note 27, at 129 (“CERCLA is not a traditional regulatory statute
23
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defenses against liability that may be used only in rare circumstances.30
Moreover, courts have also interpreted liability under CERCLA as strict,
joint and several, and retroactive.31
CERCLA’s liability provisions apply to four different categories of
“[c]overed” parties: 1) current owners or operators of a facility; 2) past
owners who owned or operated a hazardous site at the time the
hazardous waste was disposed of; 3) any person who arranged for
hazardous waste disposal, treatment, or transport of waste to a facility
operated by another party; and 4) any person who accepted hazardous
waste for transport to disposal or treatment facilities.32 The operative
word for imposing liability is “person[,]” and Congress defined person
to include, inter alia, an individual, corporation, or association.33 More
like the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air
Act. It is a remediation statute designed to impose liability for past conduct with present
effects.”).
In 1980, CERCLA was enacted in response to the serious
environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution. . . . “As
its name implies, CERCLA is a comprehensive statute that grants the
President broad power to command government agencies and private
parties to clean up hazardous waste sites.” . . . If it satisfies certain
statutory conditions, the United States may, for instance, use the
“Hazardous
Substance
Superfund”
to
finance
cleanup
efforts[.] . . . “CERCLA . . . imposes the costs of the cleanup on those
responsible for the contamination.” . . . “The remedy that Congress
felt it needed in CERCLA is sweeping: everyone who is potentially
responsible for hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to
contribute to the costs of cleanup.”
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55, 56 n.1 (1998) (citations omitted).
30
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2000). CERCLA states:
There shall be no liability . . . for a person otherwise liable who can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat
of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting
therefrom were caused solely by--(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent
of the defendant[.] . . .
Id.
31
See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1988);
see also APPLEGATE & LAITOS, supra note 27, at 130.
32
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)1–4. See David E. Dopf, Federal Common Law or State Law?: The
Ninth Circuit Takes on Successor Liability Under CERCLA in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 171, 173–75 (1999); David C. Clarke,
Successor Liability Under CERCLA: A Federal Common Law Approach, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1300, 1305 (1990) (explaining that these categories “and the statute’s legislative history[]
indicate Congress’s intent to cast a broad net of liability across all parties associated with
hazardous sites[.]”) (footnote omitted).
33
42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2005). See Smith Land & Improvement, 851 F.2d at 91, which
quoted Blackstone in describing the long-lasting vitality of a corporation:
[A]ll the individual members that have existed from the foundation to
the present time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are but one person in

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/4

Chandler: Survival of the Fittest: Federal Law v. State Law in the Context

2008]

Successor Liability Under CERCLA

155

specifically, although CERCLA fails to include “successor corporation[]”
in the definition of a “person[,]” courts have interpreted “corporation” to
include successor corporations.34 This interpretation reflects Congress’s
intent to impose liability and prevent corporations from evading liability
simply by selling a corporation or merging with another corporation.35
Unfortunately, however, while congressional intent to prevent entities
from evading liability is clear, its statutory creation, CERCLA, is less
clear on how liable parties should be determined in some instances.36
B. Liability and Steps for Remediation and the Kimbell Factors
In determining liability and steps for remediation, Congress allows
the EPA to force responsible parties to contribute in remedial and cleanup activities either by ordering liable parties to directly clean up a site
under section 106 of CERCLA, or to initiate remedial actions and then
sue liable parties to recover costs.37 Unfortunately, this authority does
law, a person that never dies; in like manner as the river Thames is still
the same river, though the parts which compose it are changing every
instant.
Id. The court explained that a corporation remains a distinct and separate entity from its
shareholders, and therefore, changes in stock ownership do not affect the rights and
obligations of the corporation as an individual entity. Id.
34
See Anspec Co., Inc., 922 F.2d at 1245 (stating that “when Congress wrote ‘corporation’
in CERCLA it intended to include a successor corporation”).
35
See Dopf, supra note 32, at 176. See also Philip G. Watson, Note, United States v.
General Battery Corp.: The Third Circuit Applies Federal Common Law Rather than State Law to
Determine Successor Liability Under CERCLA, Despite Opposing Results in Other Circuits—But
Are the Splitting Circuits Just Splitting Hairs?, 20 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 219, 221 (2006):
CERCLA has incorporated successor liability by implication. . . . Thus,
“CERCLA incorporates common law principles of indirect liability,
including successor liability.” This implicit recognition has led the
circuit courts to hold unanimously that successor liability exists under
CERCLA. Unanimity was predictable, considering that corporate
successor liability is a long-standing concept that existed at common
law.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
36
See, e.g., Warren, supra note 3, at 321 (“Numerous issues in the Act have spawned
litigation since its passage, but none, perhaps, as crucial as the determination of exactly
who should be held liable for CERCLA violations.”).
37
See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55, 56 & n.1 (1998). The Court provides the
following explanation:
“CERCLA is a comprehensive statute that grants the President broad
power to command government agencies and private parties to clean
up hazardous waste sites.” If it satisfies certain statutory conditions,
the United States may, for instance, use the “Hazardous Substance
Superfund” to finance cleanup efforts[.] . . . “[E]veryone who is
potentially responsible for hazardous-waste contamination may be
forced to contribute to the costs of cleanup.”
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not always result in the clear identification of liable individuals, and
courts are again left with the choice of which law to apply to determine
whether the party is truly liable.38 Part II.B.1 begins with a further
discussion of CERCLA’s attempt to create provisions for remediation,
and Part II.B.2 finishes with the Supreme Court’s discussion of factors to
consider when deciding whether to create federal common law.39
1.

CERCLA’s Attempt at Remediation

In the wake of CERCLA’s enactment, commentators criticized
CERCLA for its unfairness to potentially liable landowners who had
little or nothing to do with contamination but could still be sued by the
government for clean-up costs.40 Additionally, the environmental
community began to complain that the EPA was desperately failing to
implement Superfund’s enforcement measures.41 In response to these
criticisms, Congress addressed a number of issues by reauthorizing
CERCLA in 1986 by enacting the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act.42
Id. (citation omitted); see also Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 14, at 426. The authors explain
as follows:
By enacting these broad liability provisions, Congress gave the EPA
considerable latitude to shift the costs of remedial actions from the
public to private responsible parties. It also ushered in an era of
aggressive litigation between the government and responsible parties
over the scope of many of CERCLA’s provisions and the meaning of its
terms.
Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 14, at 426.
38
See Pia Dias, Note, Raytheon Constructors, Inc. v. Asarco Inc.: The Tenth Circuit Finds a
Successor in Interest Not Liable for the Cleanup Costs of a Mine Site Under CERCLA . . . But What
About State Corporate Law?, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 219, 221 (2004) (explaining that liability is
determined based on four categories outlined in section 107(a) of CERCLA and that these
categories have “ignited thousands of lawsuits”).
39
See infra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing the enduring criticisms of CERCLA’s inability to
provide adequate provisions for determining responsible parties and factors that courts are
to consider when deciding whether to fashion federal common law).
40
GERRARD & GROSS, supra note 28, at 1. The authors cite the following as one
hypothetical example of unfairness: “a party that had complied with the law and sent a
single drum of waste to a site could be sued by the government for the entire cost of site
cleanup, often in the millions or tens of millions of dollars.” Id.
41
Id. Complaints—from both the environmental community and Congress—accused
the EPA of failing to adequately enforce Superfund, and of entering into “sweetheart
deals” that did not promulgate the purpose of Superfund with respect to potentially liable
parties. Id.
42
For a comprehensive discussion of the Superfund Amendments, see id. at 2. These
authors explain that the Amendment
reshaped and reauthorized the tax that funded Superfund. It
addressed some of the fairness arguments around the edges, by, for
example, creating an explicit right to contribution among [Potentially
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Among the enduring criticisms of CERCLA is its silence about who
qualifies as a “successor corporation[]” for purposes of liability.43
Consequently, a scholarly and judicial debate has ensued over whether
state law should determine the definition, or whether the judiciary
should fashion a uniform federal common law to resolve the debate.44
Much of the problem stems from the idea that various doctrines exist
through which a successor corporation can acquire a potentially
responsible party’s hazardous site.45 Foremost among these doctrines
are statutory merger, stock acquisition, and the asset purchase
transactions.46 In some cases, even when liability is not allocated
through one of these doctrines, courts may choose to pierce the corporate
veil and impose liability on a parent corporation, an asset purchaser, or
an otherwise non-liable party. 47
Responsible Parties] and creating an exemption from liability for so
called “innocent landowners” who purchase contaminated property
unaware of the contamination, and who meet their requirements.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also APPLEGATE & LAITOS, supra note 27, at 133 (discussing that
“‘Superfund’ is a trust fund that exists to finance government-directed clean-up efforts, to
pay claims arising from clean-up activities of private parties who are not liable as
[Potentially Responsible Parties] under CERCLA . . . . The Superfund receives its money
from excise taxes on companies such as the petroleum and chemical industries.”).
43
Clarke, supra note 32, at 1305-06. The author explains that although CERCLA is silent
about who qualifies as a successor corporation, state and common law rules generally are
adequate to resolve the issue; however, other rules are unable to resolve the issue. Id.
44
See infra Parts II.D–E (discussing the arguments for which law should apply in
determining successor liability).
45
Clarke, supra note 32, at 1306. Adding to the problem is the fact that at the time a
hazardous waste site is discovered, the potentially responsible party may no longer be
incorporated because of intervening corporate mergers or acquisitions; see Anspec Co., Inc.
v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 922 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith Land & Improvement
Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988).
46
See Clarke, supra note 32, at 1306. A statutory merger generally requires that the
successor corporation, after the merger, be responsible for all of the disappearing
corporations’ liabilities under CERCLA; a merger is governed by a state’s merger laws. 15
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122, at 185 (rev. perm.
ed. 1983). A stock acquisition creates a parent-subsidiary relationship, in which liabilities
are in most instances separate between entities, including liability under CERCLA. 8 Z.
CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 161.02 (1990). Finally, in an asset purchase
transaction, one company acquires all or most of a seller’s assets, and in most cases, liability
is not passed with the assets unless there is evidence that the transaction was fraudulent or
that the transaction is merely a reorganization of the seller’s business. FLETCHER, supra, at
§§ 7122–7123.5.
47
See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 430 (4th ed.
Aspen Publishers) (2007). Steven Ferrey explains the factors considered when determining
whether an asset purchaser assumes a seller corporation’s liability:
(1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the seller’s
obligations, (2) the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape
liability, (3) the transaction is effectively the same as a consolidation or
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Whereas CERCLA is silent on the issue of successor liability, federal
circuits are split on whether to draft a federal common law defining
successor liability, or whether to decide the issue giving deference to a
forum state’s law.48 The Supreme Court has developed factors that
should be considered when deciding whether to create federal common
law or whether to simply rely on a particular state’s law.49
2.

When Is It Appropriate to Draft Federal Common Law?

First, the question is whether federal courts have the power to draft
and create federal law, and the answer is “yes!”50 “The authority [to do
so] had its origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the United States
merger of the corporations (the de facto merger exception), or (4) the
purchasing entity is merely a continuation of the selling corporation.
Id. For an example of courts piercing the corporate veil, see Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc.,
431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981).
48
See Clarke, supra note 32, at 1306 (discussing the choice that federal courts have
between applying laws of forum states or developing a federal common law of successor
liability).
49
United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
50
See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). Discussing
whether federal courts have the authority to draft federal common law following Erie, the
Supreme Court explained,
There is, of course, “no general federal common law.” Nevertheless,
the Court has recognized the need and authority in some limited areas
to formulate what has come to be known as “federal common law.”
These instances are “few and restricted,” and fall into essentially two
categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is “necessary to
protect uniquely federal interests,” and those in which Congress has
given the courts the power to develop substantive law.
Id. (citations omitted); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943).
This case involved an action filed by the United States against the Clearfield Trust
Company to recover the amount of a forged check issued pursuant to service performed
under the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1935. Id. at 366. The Court held that because
the authority to issue the check was rooted in the Constitution and statutes of the United
States, and because there was no applicable Act of Congress, the federal courts had the
duty to create a governing rule of law. Id. at 367; see also Richard G. Dennis, Liability of
Officers, Directors and Stockholders Under CERCLA: The Case for Adopting State Law, 36 VILL.
L. REV. 1367, 1440 (1991). Richard G. Dennis noted that Clearfield explained the Court’s
position as follows:
[The Court] had occasionally applied state law to federal questions,
but declared that this case was much different because of the
significant, adverse effects that state law would have both on the rights
and duties of the United States and on the large volume of transactions
involving . . . the United States.
Dennis, supra at 1440–41. Although the Clearfield Court deemed it appropriate to fashion
federal common law, the Court also made it clear that certain circumstances may make
state law more appropriate than judicially created federal law. Clearfield Trust Co., 318 U.S.
at 367.
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and was in no way dependent on the laws [of any state].”51 However,
the authority to create a new rule, or federal common law, is very
different than the Court’s recognized rule under Marbury v. Madison52
that the judiciary has the responsibility to construe a statute and
interpret the law.53 Consequently, the Supreme Court is careful not to
fashion federal common law when it is unnecessary.54
In United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., nearly four decades after the
Court decided that under some circumstances judicial creation of federal
law might be necessary, the Court crafted three factors to guide courts in
deciding whether to fashion a federal common law.55 The Kimbell factors
51
See Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. at 726 (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
318 U.S. 366–67 (1943)). Compare id., which explained the following:
This Court has consistently held that federal law governs questions
involving the rights of the United States arising under nationwide
federal programs. “When the United States disburses its funds or pays
its debts, it is exercising a constitutional function or power. . . . In
absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to
fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.”
Id. (citation omitted) and Clarke, supra note 32, at 1309 (explaining that cases which arise
under federal laws grant federal courts the power to create federal common laws), with
Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 n.21, also explaining as follows:
Whether state law is to be incorporated as a matter of federal common
law . . . involves the . . . problem of the relationship of a particular
issue to a going federal program.
The question of judicial
incorporation can only arise in an area which is sufficiently close to a
national operation to establish competence in the federal courts to
choose the governing law, and yet not so close as clearly to require the
application of a single nationwide rule of substance.
Id.
52
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
53
But see N.W. Airlines, Inc. v. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981) (“But the authority
to construe a statute is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule or
to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to adopt.”).
54
See O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 79, 90 (1994) (“Federal
courts, however, ‘unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction that have
not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers.’ . . . Unless Congress has otherwise
directed, the federal court’s task is merely to interpret and apply the relevant rules of state
law.”) (citation omitted); see also Atherton v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 519 U.S. 213, 218
(1997) (“The Court has said that ‘cases in which judicial creation of a special federal rule
would be justified . . . are . . . ‘few and restricted.’”).
55
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. at 728. (“Whether to adopt state law or to fashion a
nationwide federal rule is a matter of judicial policy ‘dependent upon a variety of
considerations always relevant to the nature of the specific governmental interests and to
the effects upon them of applying state law.’”). The issue in Kimbell was whether
contractual liens, created under federal loan programs, took precedence over private liens
when no applicable Act of Congress existed. Id. at 715. To resolve the issue, the Court
determined whether federal law or state law should decide the issue and established
several factors that it considered in making its decision. Id. at 728–29.
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are as follows: 1) whether there is a need for uniformity;56 2) whether the
application of state law would disrupt the specific purposes of the
federal law or program;57 and 3) whether the adoption of a federal rule
would frustrate commercial relationships rooted in state law.58 More
specifically, to define further Kimbell’s third factor, some courts consider
the following three ways that a federal rule could frustrate commercial
relationships in non-CERCLA liability cases:59 1) whether commercial
Id. at 728 (explaining that “when there is little need for a uniform body of law, state
law may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision”). Many cases applying the Kimbell
test have considered a variety of factors in determining the appropriate response to
Kimbell’s first factor of whether there is a need for a uniform federal law; one commentator
argues that these factors create a more sophisticated analysis of the issue than the standard
CERCLA cases. See Dennis, supra note 50, at 1446. The author argues that
[f]or the purposes of this discussion, these factors can be grouped into
four categories: (1) the presence or absence of express or implied
congressional intent that a uniform federal rule be created; (2) the
effects that diverse state laws would have on federal rights; (3) the
effects that state laws would have on operations; and (4) the likelihood
that a uniform law could actually be created by the federal courts.
Id. at 1445–46.
57
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. at 728 (arguing that when state law would frustrate a
federal program’s objective, “we must fashion special rules solicitous of those federal
interests[]”). The Court applied these newly created factors and decided to adopt state law
rather than creating a uniform federal law because the state codes were consistent with
federal interests and because a uniform federal rule would only disrupt private creditors’
daily transactions. Id. at 729–40.
58
Id. at 728–29; see also Dennis, supra note 50, at 1442. The author analyzes the use and
applicability of the test created in Kimbell Foods:
The test created in Kimbell Foods has been used in a vast number of
cases in numerous areas of law. At the most fundamental level, the
test is actually about control: should the federal courts surrender a
portion of their power to influence the growth and development of a
federal statute or program, in order to accommodate the interests
represented in existing law? The first two elements of the Kimbell Foods
test measure the extent of the federal interests that are at stake. The
final element gauges the possible disruption to the state interests. In
essence, the question is whether the federal judiciary will allow the
development of state law to dictate the direction that the federal
statute or program will take, at least with respect to the issue in
question.
Dennis, supra note 50, at 1442 (footnote omitted). The author comments that
courts have held that frustration of commercial relationships established on state
law may occur in the following three different ways: first, courts have
considered the disruption of commercial relationships in actions taken before the
adoption of a federal rule, where corporations had anticipated that the issue
would be handled by state law; second, courts have considered the disruption of
commercial relationships that might occur after a federal rule has become wellknown and widely applied; and third, courts have considered the uncertainty
caused by the adoption and application of a new federal law. Id. at 1503–06.
59
Id. at 1502–03. The author observes as follows:
56
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relationships are disrupted when a corporation anticipated that an issue
was to be governed by state law;60 2) whether disruption of commercial
relationships will result once a federal standard has been widely
applied;61 and 3) whether commercial relationships would be disrupted
by the uncertainty that newly fashioned federal common law creates.62
Although the Supreme Court has never decided whether federal
common law should be fashioned to resolve the issue of successor
liability, in 1998 the Court briefly noted the disagreement.63 The Court
did not entertain the issue further because neither party challenged the
lower court’s ruling on successor liability.64 By not addressing the
problem, the Court missed the opportunity to resolve the judicial and
scholarly debate concerning whether federal or state law should apply.
[A]pplication of the law of the state of incorporation to external affairs
could pose problems if the litigation involved several different
corporations in an integrated corporate structure, each having a
different state of incorporation. . . . [Therefore], officers, directors and
stockholders of a corporation can have no reasonable or legitimate
expectations that the law of the state of incorporation will protect them
in CERCLA liability cases.
In non-CERCLA liability cases, courts have held that disruption
of commercial relationships predicated on state law may occur in
several different ways.
Id. (footnote omitted).
60
Id. at 1503. See also United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 241–42 (1960). In Brosnan,
the Supreme Court did not create a federal common law rule to deal with the nullification
of federal tax liens in the foreclosure proceedings of particular states. Id. The Court held
that although a federal rule might be helpful for uniformity reasons, it would be more
consistent with Congress’s prior actions to allow state law to govern. Id.
61
Dennis, supra note 50, at 1503; see also United States v. Hadden Haciendas Co., 541
F.2d 777, 785 (9th Cir. 1976). In Hadden Haciendas Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
created a federal rule that allowed post-foreclosure actions for damages. 541 F.2d at 785.
The court created the rule upon finding that the rule did not intrude on states’ laws
protecting debtors because the protection offered by a state’s statutes could be achieved by
the application of a federally uniform rule. Id.
62
Dennis, supra note 50, at 1503; see also Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d
1454, 1460 (9th Cir. 1986). In Mardan Corp, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals mentioned
two concerns that a federal rule might present to litigants applying a newly created federal
law. 804 F.2d at 1460. One of these concerns is particularly relevant to the issue of
successor liability: whether application of a new federal law, in place of an established
state law, might create uncertainty as to the manner in which a rule is to be applied in
different circumstances. Id.
63
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 n.9 (1998). (“There is significant
disagreement among courts and commentators regarding whether, in enforcing CERCLA’s
indirect liability, courts should borrow state law, or instead apply a federal common law of
veil piercing.”). The Court then cited a slew of court cases and scholarly articles that
discuss the problem. Id.
64
Id. (“Since none of the parties challenges the Sixth Circuit’s holding that CPC and
Aerojet incurred no derivative liability, the question is not presented in this case, and we
do not address it further.”).
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C. Determining Who Is a Successor Corporation
One difficulty courts often face in deciding liability is determining
who actually is a successor corporation. In United States v. Davis, the
First Circuit Court of Appeals considered the question of whether state
or federal law should apply.65 In deciding the issue, the court considered
two tests to determine whether a corporation was truly a successor
corporation under CERCLA: the “mere continuation” test and the
“substantial continuation” test.66 Several circuits have applied one of
these two tests to determine whether a potentially responsible party
truly is a successor corporation.67
65
United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 53 (1st Cir. 2001). A disposer of solid waste, found
liable for clean-up costs under CERCLA, sought contribution from several other potentially
responsible parties. Id. at 14–15. Five of the potentially responsible parties appealed a
declaratory judgment against them made by the district court. Id. at 14. The court, with
respect to successor liability, addressed the possible use of both the “mere continuation”
and “substantial continuation” tests. Id. at 53. After mentioning these two tests, the court
looked to the Kimbell factors used for deciding when it is appropriate to fashion a federal
common law. Id. Specifically, the court referenced the “substantial continuation” test as
one that many courts have referenced when arguing for the need to create a uniform
federal law; the court also noted that several courts have held that the test satisfies
CERCLA’s remedial purposes. Id.
66
Id. at 52–55. After considering arguments for and against the application of these
tests, the Court chose to follow state law, holding that the applicable state law was not
hostile to federal interests under CERCLA.
67
Id. at 53. In this case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the Second and
Fourth Circuits have considered the “substantial continuation” and “mere continuation”
tests. Id. In B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, the Federal and Connecticut State governments, along
with a coalition of settling defendants in a previous action, sued non-settling defendants to
recover costs spent in cleaning up landfills containing hazardous waste. 99 F.3d 505, 511–
13 (2d Cir. 1996). The Second Circuit, after declining to apply the “mere continuation” test,
instead applied the common law “substantial continuity” test, reasoning that it is more
consistent with CERCLA’s goals. Id. at 519. In 1997, the Second Circuit clarified its 1996
holding and further supported adoption of a uniform federal rule under the Kimbell
analysis, concluding the following in a per curiam opinion:
[e]ach of the Kimbell Foods factors supports our decision-there is a
significant need for a uniform rule, allowing lenient state law rules to
control would defeat federal policy, and we perceive no danger that
our decision to adopt a federal rule of “substantial continuity” will
unduly upset existing corporate relationships.
B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 112 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 1997). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court
later denied certiorari on this case. In United States v. Carolina Transformer, Co., after
recognizing CERCLA’s silence as to the liability of successor corporations, the Fourth
Circuit held that successor liability is permitted under CERCLA if it is justified by the facts
of the case. 978 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 1992). The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court’s
use of the federal common law “substantial continuity” test, stating “[i]n adopting a rule of
successor liability in this case we ‘must consider traditional and evolving principles of
federal common law, which Congress has left to the courts to supply interstitially.’” Id. at
837–38 (citation omitted). After applying this test to the facts before them, the court found
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The “mere continuation” test is designed to help protect creditors
from corporations that try to avoid hazardous waste claims.68 Courts
that apply this test generally consider five factors: 1) transfer of assets; 2)
a purchase by the buyer for less than the fair market value for the assets;
3) a continuation of the seller’s business by the purchaser; 4) a common
officer between the two corporations (buyer and seller) that was
influential in the asset transfer; and 5) an inability of the selling
corporation to pay its debts after the assets are transferred.69
The “substantial continuation” test, adopted as the federal common
law by circuits in favor of uniformity, has been adopted to help resolve
issues involving potential “successor corporations[.]”70
This test
incorporates eight factors:
(1) retention of the same employees [by the buyer]; (2)
retention of the same supervisory personnel; (3)
retention of the same production facilities in the same
location; (4) production of the same product; (5)
retention of the same name; (6) continuity of assets; (7)
continuity of general business operations; and (8)
whether the buyer holds itself out as a continuation of
the divesting corporation[.]71
After considering the opposing arguments for application of state
law versus a federal rule—such as the “substantial continuation” test—

FayTranCo. to be a liable successor corporation to Carolina Transformer under CERCLA.
Id. at 838. The court reasoned as follows:
We are unwilling to hold that merely by splitting-off the particular
part of its operations that resulted in its environmental problems and
shifting the remainder of its assets, employees, management,
customers, accounts and production methods to another corporation,
an otherwise responsible corporation could all but completely wash its
hands of its environmental liability.
Id. at 840.
68
Davis, 261 F.3d at 53 (citation omitted) (“The ‘mere continuation’ test is an exception to
the common law rule that the buyer of a corporation’s assets (as opposed to its stock) does
not incur liability for the divesting corporation’s debts. The test is designed to protect
creditors from sales that seek to evade valid claims.”).
69
Id.
70
Id.; Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d at 838; see also Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that most states do
not recognize the “substantial continuation” test).
71
Davis, 261 F.3d at 53 (citation omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted) (explaining
that courts adopt the “substantial continuation” test because it meets CERCLA’s “broad
remedial purpose” and emphasizes the “importance of national uniformity” in
determining successor liability).
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the Davis Court chose to apply Connecticut’s “mere continuation” test.72
In deciding which law to apply, the court applied the Kimbell factors, and
concluded, “to justify the creation of a federal rule, ‘there must be a
specific concrete federal policy or interest that is compromised by the
application of state law.’”73
D. Circuits Adopting Federal Common Law
CERCLA enforcement should not be hampered by subordination of its goals
to varying state law rules of alter ego theory and limited liability. Because of the
lack of persuasive authority arguing for a contrary result, the choice of federal
common law to govern this area appears likely to become a matter of settled
law.74
Ascertaining the scope of legislative intent in enacting CERCLA
helps to understand the issues Congress desired to resolve with
CERCLA.75 In 1980, then Representative James Florio, the primary
sponsor for CERCLA, argued before the House of Representatives that
one of CERCLA’s primary purposes was “[t]o insure [sic] the
development of a uniform rule of law, and to discourage business [sic]
dealing in hazardous substances from locating primarily in States with

72
Id. at 54. (“We have concluded that the majority rule is to apply state law ‘so long as it
is not hostile to the federal interests animating CERCLA[.]’”).
73
Id.
74
See Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 14, at 455.
75
See supra note 20 (explaining various representatives’ opinions concerning CERCLA’s
legislation); see also Dennis, supra note 50, 1473–74. Richard G. Dennis sought to establish
the objectives of CERCLA through legislative history by paraphrasing Senator Randolph’s,
the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, description of
CERCLA’s purpose. Dennis, supra note 50, at 1473. Dennis stated that the Senate bill was
aimed at the following objectives:
First, to make those who release hazardous substances strictly
liable for cleanup costs, mitigation, and third party damages. . . .
Second, the bill would establish a broad Federal response
authority, and a fund of $4.1 billion over 6 years to clean up and
mitigate damages where a liable party does not clean up or cannot be
found.
Third, the bill would provide an opportunity through the courts,
and a more limited opportunity through the fund, for victims to
receive prompt and adequate compensation for losses and injuries.
Fourth, the bill would provide that the fund be financed largely
by those industries and consumers who profit from products and
services associated with the hazardous substances which impose risks
on society.
Id. at 1474.
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more lenient laws[.]”76 Although this statement may provide courts an
immediate reason for adopting a federal rule that fills gaps in a federal
statute, the Supreme Court has cautioned that controversies affecting the
administration of federal programs do not require resolution by uniform
federal rules.77 In contrast, the Court has stated that “[w]hether to adopt
state law or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a matter of judicial
policy ‘dependent upon a variety of considerations always relevant to
the nature of the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon
them of applying state law.’”78 In the controversy regarding which law
to apply when determining successor liability under CERCLA, two
circuits, the Third and the Fourth, have decided that creating a uniform
federal rule would best serve CERCLA’s purposes.79
76
126 CONG. REC. H31,965 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Florio). For a short
biographical account of Representative Florio, see BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS 1774–2005 1064 (Andrew R. Dodge & Betty K. Koed eds., U.S. Gov.
Printing Office 2005):
Florio, James Joseph, a Representative from New Jersey; born in
Brooklyn, N.Y., August 29, 1937; attended the public elementary
schools in Brooklyn; received high school equivalency diploma from
State of New Jersey; B.A., Trenton (N.J.) State College, 1962; graduate
work, Columbia University, New York, 1962–1963; J.D., Rutgers
University Law School, 1967; admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1967
and commenced practice in Camden; served in United States Navy,
1955–1958, ensign; lieutenant commander, United States Navy
Reserve, 1958–1975; assistant city attorney for Camden City Legal
Department, 1967–1971; solicitor for the New Jersey towns of
Runnemade, Wood-Lynne, and Somerdale, 1969–1974; assemblyman,
New Jersey State Legislature, 1970–1974; unsuccessful candidate for
the nomination for Governor of New Jersey in 1977 and unsuccessful
candidate for Governor in 1981; elected as a Democrat to the Ninetyfourth and to the seven succeeding Congresses and served from
January 3, 1975, until his resignation January 16, 1990; elected
Governor of New Jersey in 1989 and served from January 16, 1990, to
January 18, 1994; unsuccessful candidate for reelection in 1993; is a
resident of Gloucester Township, N.J.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
77
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727–28 (1979).
78
Id. at 728.
79
New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 208 (2d Cir. 2006). The court, in
analyzing the choice of law question, compared the holdings and decisions of its sister
circuits. Id. at 207–08. Specifically, the court noted that the Third and Fourth Circuits had
concluded that a national rule is required by CERCLA. Id. at 208; see United States v.
Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992). Carolina Transformer Co. was the
result of the removal of polychlorinated biphenyls from a site previously owned by
Defendant Carolina Transformer, Inc. 978 F.2d at 834. While the Defendants owned the
site, they recovered and repaired electrical transformers on the site and carcinogenicbearing transformer oil spilled onto the site. Id. Consequently, Carolina Transformer was
sued along with FayTranCo and several other corporations in an action to recover the costs
incurred in cleaning up the site. Id. After noting that CERCLA is silent as to the issue of
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The Third Circuit was the first to favor creating a uniform federal
rule to resolve CERCLA’s silence regarding successor liability.80 The
successor liability, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held it appropriate to “consider
traditional and evolving principles of federal common law, which Congress has left to the
courts to supply interstitially.” Id. at 837–38. After adopting a federal common law
approach, the court applied the “substantial continuity” approach in finding FayTranCo
liable as a successor corporation to Carolina Transformer. Id. at 838. The Fourth Circuit
found the following facts most relevant in finding substantial continuity between
FayTranCo and Carolina Transformer, and consequently holding FayTranCo liable as a
successor:
In sum, we find that there was substantial continuity between Carolina
Transformer and FayTranCo. FayTranCo retained most of Carolina
Transformer’s employees working in the same jobs, receiving the same
salary, and maintaining accrued leave time. Many, if not all, of
Carolina Transformer’s supervisory personnel went to similar
positions at FayTranCo. Dewey Strother continued to have personal
influence over and involvement with the new company. Carolina
Transformer’s equipment, inventory and motor vehicles were
transferred to FayTranCo. Moreover, the move to new premises was
an integral part of an apparent attempt by those controlling FayTranCo
and Carolina Transformer to distance themselves, both physically and
legally, from the PCB-contaminated Middle Road site. FayTranCo
produced basically the same product as Carolina Transformer, and any
changes in the product were dictated by external market forces, which
would have operated with equal force on Carolina Transformer had
there not been a transfer of the business to FayTranCo. There was a
continuity of assets, Carolina Transformer having transferred all of its
assets with the exception of the buildings and land at the Middle Road
site. FayTranCo held itself out as being a continuation of Carolina
Transformer, informing its credit customers that their debts would
become the accounts of FayTranCo. Finally, the record as a whole
leaves the unmistakable impression that the transfer of the Carolina
Transformer business to FayTranCo was part of an effort to continue
the business in all material respects yet avoid the environmental
liability arising from the PCB contamination at the Middle Road site.
For these reasons, we are of opinion that the district court did not err
in granting summary judgment against FayTranCo as a successor
corporation.
Id. at 840–41.
80
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988). This
case involved the purchase of land containing hazardous waste. Id. at 87. The purchaser
sued potentially responsible parties seeking contribution for expenses incurred in cleaning
up the site’s hazardous waste. Id. The defendant argued that the contract principle of
caveat emptor acted as a defense to liability; the court rejected this defense, reasoning that
to apply caveat emptor as a defense would completely frustrate Congress’s objective for
enacting CERCLA. Id. at 88–90. The court interpreted that CERCLA intended the expenses
to be the responsibility of one of two sources: 1) those persons who had an integral part in
the creation or continuation of the hazardous waste, or 2) taxpayers. Id. at 92. Finally, the
court held that the issue should be governed by a federal rule of successor liability. Id.
Specifically, the court held that the general doctrine of successor liability as applied in the
majority of states should be applied in the case, reasoning, “[i]n resolving the successor
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Circuit’s first consideration of the issue came in its 1988 decision in Smith
Land & Improvement v. Celotex Corp.; however, the Third Circuit revisited
the issue in 2005 in United States v. General Battery Corp., Inc.81 In General
Battery, Exide—the undisputed successor corporation to General
Battery—was sued by the United States to recover costs incurred for
clean-up initiated by the government after the EPA had decided that
remedial action on several properties was required to protect human
health.82 The hazardous waste found at the properties was disposed of
between 1920 and 1966 by Price Battery (a now-defunct company), a
manufacturer of acid batteries.83 In 1966, General Battery purchased
Price Battery.84 In 2000, General Battery then merged with Exide
Corporation, resulting in Exide being named a successor in interest to
General Battery for purposes of liability under CERCLA.85 Exide
contended that although it was a successor corporation to General

liability issues here, the district court must consider national uniformity; otherwise,
CERCLA aims may be evaded easily by a responsible party’s choice to arrange a merger or
consolidation under the laws of particular states which unduly restrict successor liability.”
Id.
81
United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that
the court had addressed the same issue in Smith Land, where it held that a uniform federal
law should be adopted as derived from the general doctrine of successor liability adopted
by the majority of states).
82
Id. at 296. A 1992 EPA study found that several properties contained excessive levels
of lead. Id. Consequently, the United States government incurred several million dollars in
response-costs to clean up and install a remedial “cap” at the properties. Id.
83
Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d at 296; see also Richard A. Smolen, Note, Get the Lead
Out: Innocent Successor Corporations Responsibility Under CERCLA—United States v. General
Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005)., 25 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 137, 144
(2006). Richard Smolen explained in greater detail that Price Battery was a Pennsylvania
corporation that disposed “of old battery casings while reusing the lead plates from old
batteries.” Smolen, supra, at 144.
84
Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d at 296. General Battery acquired Price Battery for cash
and stock. Id. More specifically, General Battery acquired all of the company’s assets—
except for Price Battery’s real property—for $2.95 million, 100,000 shares of General Battery
stock, and a seat on General Battery’s board of directors. Id. However, Price Battery sold
their real property to a development organization, which leased the property to General
Battery until 1978 when the deed was transferred to General Battery for $1. Id. at 297.
Additionally, under the purchase agreement, General Battery acquired Price Battery’s
equipment, as well as all intellectual property and inventory. Id. General Battery also
assumed responsibility of Price’s contractual obligations and all of their liabilities
appearing on Price’s balance sheet. Id. Finally, General Battery continued to employee
Price’s three executive officers and continued to manufacture batteries at Price Battery’s
Hamburg plant. Id.
85
Id. at 296 (“Exide is General Battery’s successor. The disputed issue is whether
General Battery, by virtue of its 1966 acquisition of Price Battery, was a successor to Price
Battery.”).
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Battery, General Battery was not a successor corporation to Price Battery;
and, therefore, Exide was not liable as a successor in interest.86
After considering the facts, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reasoned that CERCLA requires a uniform federal definition of
“successor corporation[.]”87 The court focused on the idea that state law
varies widely on the issue of successor liability and that this uncertainty
favors federal uniformity.88 Additionally, the court reasoned that the
Id. at 297.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court held the
Price/General transaction constituted a common law “de facto
merger.” . . . [T]he parties stipulated to past CERCLA response costs at
the Hamburg site in the amount of $6,500,000. Exide retained the right
to file this appeal as to liability.
Id. at 297. See also Smolen, supra note 83, at 147. The United States alleged that Exide was
liable as a successor in interest and both parties sought summary judgment. Id. The
District Court denied Exide’s motion and granted the government’s motion, holding that
General Battery and Price Battery had engaged in a “de facto merger.” Id. Exide then
appealed, to the Third Circuit. Id. On appeal, the Third Circuit split their consideration of
the matter into two issues: whether state or federal law should resolve the issue of
successor liability, and whether Price Battery and General Battery had truly engaged in a
“de facto merger[.]” Id.
87
Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d at 300. The court held, “‘[t]he resulting federal rule,
based on a body of case law developed over time, is statutory interpretation pursuant to
congressional direction,’ not the free-wheeling creation of federal common law.’” Id.
(quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998)).
88
Id. at 302. (“A more uniform and predictable federal liability standard corresponds
with specific CERCLA objectives by encouraging settlements and facilitating a more liquid
market in corporate and ‘brownfield’ assets.”); see also Smolen, supra note 83, at 148.
Among other points, Smolen emphasized the following:
The court then addressed Exide's contention that the Supreme Court in
O’Melveny had eroded the Third Circuit’s precedents because it had
“cautioned against the unwarranted displacement of state law.” The
Third Circuit reasoned that this reasoning was inapposite because
CERCLA creates its own federal cause of action. Furthermore, the
court noted that recent Supreme Court decisions had indicated that
gaps in the statutory language should be filled with federal common
law and that a state-by-state determination of liability conflicts with
the objectives of CERCLA.
Moreover, the court noted with
particularity the minutiae of different standards used in different
jurisdictions, and advocated that that lack of uniformity was reason
enough for using a set federal standard.
Smolen, supra note 83, at 148 (footnotes omitted). “Brownfield site” has been defined as
“[a]n abandoned, idled, or underused industrial or commercial site that is difficult to
expand or redevelop because of environmental contamination.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
206 (8th ed. 2004). One of CERCLA’s objectives is to encourage settlements among adverse
litigants and to advance and facilitate a liquid market in “brownfield” assets, or, in other
words, to encourage the clean-up, transfer, and redevelopment of contaminated sites. 42
U.S.C. §§ 9607(r), 9622 (2006). The Third Circuit in General Battery reasoned that a more
uniform and predictable standard would satisfy CERCLA’s goals of encouraging
settlements and creating a more liquid market for “brownfield” assets. Gen. Battery Corp.,
86
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purpose of the 2001 Amendments to CERCLA—“to balance the interest
in cost recovery under CERCLA’s liability provisions with the economic
interest in a liquid market for ‘brownfield’ assets[]”—would be served
by a uniform test for successor liability.89 The court concluded by
distinguishing the creation of a federal uniform law from statutory
interpretation.90 The court held that creating a uniform definition of
“successor corporation” constitutes interpretation and not statutory
construction.91 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
October of 2006, leaving the issue undecided.92
Courts wrestle with whether it is appropriate to create federal
common law rules.93 In 1966, the Supreme Court explained that, before
federal common law can be created, a significant conflict must be present
between federal interests and the application of state law.94
Additionally, the Court has held that the creation of federal law is
restricted to issues in which Congress has specifically granted courts the
power to create common law and to issues where federal common law is
necessary to guard particular federal interests.95 Consequently, many
courts and scholars have been in favor of the application of state law.96

Inc., 423 F.3d at 302. But see Smolen, supra note 83, at 151–52 (explaining that applying a
uniform rule under CERCLA would not satisfy Congress’s purposes, and would be
contrary to Congress’s desire to have state common law rules resolve the issue).
89
Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d at 303 n.8. The court also noted two cases from the
First Circuit (a proponent of applying state law to resolve the successor liability issue) and
one from the Third Circuit which explained that reducing litigation costs was a primary
objective of CERCLA. Id. The court concluded this portion of the opinion by stating,
“CERCLA’s goal of minimizing litigation and transaction costs is ill-served by a case-bycase approach to the question of successor liability choice-of-law, we need not inquire
whether Pennsylvania law conflicts with or mirrors the majority successor liability doctrine
before holding that a federal rule applies.” Id. at 304.
90
Id. (“[T]he authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different than the authority
to fashion a new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to
adopt.”).
91
Id.
92
Exide Techs. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 41 (2006) (The Supreme Court denied the
petition for writ of certiorari).
93
Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 14, at 451 (“Such confusion is not unusual in areas of
substantive law where the need for a federal common law rule of veil-piercing is
recognized.”).
94
Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (holding that state law
should apply because no conflict existed between the federal act in question and the
application of Louisiana state law) (footnote omitted).
95
Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1980).
[T]he Court has recognized the need and authority in some limited
areas to formulate what has come to be known as ‘federal common
law.’ These instances are ‘few and restricted,’ and fall into essentially
two categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is ‘necessary
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Argument for Application of State Law
State law is incorporated to govern interpretation of contractual
agreements allocating CERCLA liability; there is no reason to think
that [a] uniform body of law is required, application of state law would
not frustrate specific objective[s] of CERCLA, and fashioning national
interpretive standard[s] might interfere with reasonable commercial
expectations.97

If the definition of successor liability was to be decided by a majority
vote among the federal circuits, the argument for application of state law
would win 4-2.98 Four circuits have favored the application of state
law—the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh.99 To give a comprehensive,
but not exhaustive, consideration of the argument for application of state
law, three of the circuits’ holdings will be considered below.100 The most
recent circuit to hold in favor of state law is the First Circuit in United
States v. Davis, and it is considered in Part II.E.1.101 The Sixth and Ninth
Circuits’ adoptions of state law will be considered in Parts II.E.2 and
II.E.3, respectively.

to protect uniquely federal interests,’ and those in which Congress has
given the courts the power to develop substantive law[.]
Id. (citations omitted).
96
See infra Part II.E (presenting the arguments for the application of state law to
determine whether a party is liable for clean-up under CERCLA).
97
P. H. Vartanian, Annotation, Duty of Federal Courts, Since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, in
Determining Ultimate Federal Question, to Follow State Laws or State Court Decisions of
Substantive Character, Upon Questions Which Are Preliminary, Incidental, or Collateral to the
Ultimate Federal Question, 140 A.L.R. 717 (1942).
98
New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 201, 207–08 (2006) (citing the various
circuits’ current stances on the application of federal law or state law).
99
Id.
100
See infra Parts II.E.1–3 (discussing the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits’ reasoning for
application of state law to resolve the issue of successor liability).
101
United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 52–55 (1st Cir. 2001). In this case, defendant Davis
operated a waste disposal site in Rhode Island in the 1970s. Id. at 15. In the early 1980s, the
EPA placed the site on the National Priorities List, and in 1987, the EPA issued an order
describing the clean-up necessary at the site. Id. The report indicated that the clean-up
required the government to complete a water line that would supply clean drinking water
to areas where the water wells had been contaminated and where other wells were
threatened by possible contamination. Id. The report also required that the government
clean up any contaminated groundwater and excavate and clean soils that had been
contaminated and that were a source of contaminating the groundwater. Id. When the
United States government filed suit in 1990, 100 homes were within one mile of the site,
and approximately 3,800 residents lived within three miles of the site. Id.
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The First Circuit

In Davis, the government brought suit against Davis as an owneroperator to collect costs incurred for the clean-up of a hazardous site.102
On appeal, several possible responsible parties argued that they were not
successors in interest to the Davis site, and were therefore not liable.103
Black & Decker argued that the federal common law “substantial
continuation” test should govern the issue of successor corporation
under CERCLA, whereas Electroformers argued that the State of
Connecticut’s “mere continuation” test should govern.104 In evaluating
which test to apply, the Davis Court considered the Kimbell factors to be
used when deciding whether to create federal rules.105
The Davis court noted that some circuits have chosen to adopt the
“substantial continuation” test because it satisfies CERCLA’s “broad
remedial purpose” and because of the “importance of national
uniformity.”106 However, the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this
rationale and instead decided that the majority rule is to follow state law
as long as it does not frustrate federal interests under CERCLA.107
Furthermore, the Davis Court rebutted the argument for creating a
federal rule by explaining that no specific or concrete federal policy
would be compromised by applying state law.108

Id.
Id. at 52.
104
Id. at 52–53.
105
Id. at 53.
In general, before creating a federal rule courts must consider whether
federal interests require a nationally uniform body of law, whether
applying state law would frustrate or conflict with a specific federal
objective, and the extent to which a federal rule would disrupt
commercial relationships predicated on state law.
Id.; see infra Parts III.A–C (discussing the application of these factors to the issue of whether
state or federal law should govern in the realm of successor liability).
106
Davis, 261 F.3d at 53. The court reconsidered the lower court’s application of the
“mere continuation” test and found Black & Decker to be a successor corporation, and
therefore liable for clean-up costs. Id. at 54. In deciding this, the court looked to the
following facts: “(1) MITE and Electroformers did not share a common officer or director
who was involved in the transfer; (2) MITE received fair compensation for Gar; (3) MITE
continued to operate its other businesses; [and] (4) MITE remained financially viable.” Id..
107
Id. at 52.
108
Id. at 54 (explaining that no evidence existed suggesting that the application of state
law to the facts of Davis’s case would frustrate federal goals).
102
103
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The Sixth Circuit

The Sixth Circuit was one of the first to address the issue of
successor liability in Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc.109 In this
case, Plaintiff Anspec bought land in Michigan in 1978 from Defendant
Ultaspherics.110 After selling the property, Ultraspherics went through a
series of mergers ending in 1987 when it merged with Hoover Group, the
designated surviving corporation.111 Sometime prior to selling the
property to Anspec, Ultraspherics buried an underground storage tank
on the property and placed two above-ground storage tanks on the
site.112 All of the tanks were filled to capacity with hazardous
substances, which later leaked into the soil and groundwater.113
Additionally, Utlaspherics further contaminated the site through various
leaks and spills of toxic liquids.114 After being charged by the
government to clean up the site, Anspec contacted Ultraspherics
requesting them to pay the costs for the clean-up; Ultraspherics,
however, refused.115
After reviewing both CERCLA’s language and legislative history, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that neither CERCLA’s
language nor legislative history supported the inference that Congress
Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1243.
111
Id. The court cited Fletcher, explaining that when two corporations statutorily merge,
all liabilities are the responsibility of the surviving corporation. Id.
In case of merger of one corporation into another, where one of the
corporations ceases to exist and the other corporation continues in
existence, the latter corporation is liable for the debts, contracts and
torts of the former, at least to the extent of the property and assets
received, and this liability is often expressly imposed by statute.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also FLETCHER, supra note 46, at 226. The Anspec court argued
later in the opinion that
the law in the fifty states on corporate dissolution and successor
liability is largely uniform. For example, all states agree that the
surviving corporation in a statutory merger assumes the debts and
liabilities of the constituent corporations. And all states have statutes
providing for post-dissolution liability of corporations for liabilities
existing prior to dissolution.
Anspec Co., Inc., 922 F.2d at 1249 (citations omitted).
112
Id. at 1243.
113
Id. The facts indicated that contamination was the result of Ultrapsheric’s routine
disposal of hazardous sludge and liquids that caused the hazardous materials to spill into
the soil and groundwater. Id. In addition, toxic cleaning solvents leaked, thereby further
contaminating the soil and groundwater. Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. (“The plaintiffs notified Ultraspherics that they were required to clean up the site
and requested Ultraspherics to pay the costs associated with the cleanup. When
Ultraspherics refused this request, the plaintiffs filed the present action.”).
109
110

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/4

Chandler: Survival of the Fittest: Federal Law v. State Law in the Context

2008]

Successor Liability Under CERCLA

173

intended to create a uniform federal rule of successor liability.116 After
reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that a “corporation[,]” as
defined under section 9607 of CERCLA, should be determined based on
the law upon which the “corporation” was formed.117 The court held
that because all of the corporations involved in the litigation were
created under state law, the question of successor liability should also be
determined by the law of the state under which the litigants were
incorporated, unless the application of state law would interfere with
federal policy.118 Additionally, the court reasoned that application of the
Kimbell test supported adoption of state corporation law when resolving
the issue of successor liability.119 Finally, the court disagreed with the
common argument among its sister circuits that have promoted the
creation of federal law, noting that adoption of state law would cause
states to engage in a “race to the bottom” (passing more lenient laws
limiting vicarious liability) in an effort to attract corporations.120 The
Anspec court instead concluded that states have an interest in protecting
their resources and citizens—an interest that most states have expressed

Id. at 1248 n.1 (“CERCLA is silent rather than unambiguous on the issue of the
meaning of ‘corporation’ generally and successor liability specifically.”). But see Dennis,
supra note 50, at 1445 (explaining that other considerations suggest that uniformity may
have been Congress’s intent; the author quoted Representative Florio stating, “[t]o insure
[sic] the development of a uniform rule of law, and to discourage business [sic] dealing in
hazardous substances from locating primarily in states with more lenient laws, the bill will
encourage the further development of a Federal common law in this area”).
117
Anspec Co., Inc., 922 F.2d at 1248. The court reached this conclusion following a
discussion of which law was appropriate given CERCLA’s purposes and legislative
history. Id. at 1247.
118
Id. at 1248. The court quoted several authors, noting as follows:
The federal “command” to incorporate state law may be a judicial
rather than a legislative command; that is, it may be determined as a
matter of choice of law, even in the absence of statutory command or
implication, that, although federal law should “govern” a given
question, state law furnishes an appropriate and convenient measure
of the content of this federal law.
Id. at 148 n.2 (quoting P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN, & D. SHAPIRO, HART &
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 862 (3d ed. 1988)). The Anspec
court later concluded its opinion, quoting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and holding
that these rules provide that whether a corporation is to sue or be sued is determined by
the law under which the corporation was organized. Anspec Co., Inc., 922 F.2d at 1251.
119
Anspec Co., Inc., 922 F.2d at 1249 n.5. The court also noted that two of its sister circuits
had not mentioned the Kimbell test in holding that federal common law should govern the
issue of successor liability, stating, “[b]oth of those courts concluded, almost without
analysis, that a federal common law of successor liability was required by CERCLA.” Id.
The court also considered whether the application of state law is inadequate to accomplish
the purposes of CERCLA, and the court held that state law is adequate. Id.
120
Id. at 1250.
116
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by creating statutes and administrative bodies similar to CERCLA and
the EPA.121
3.

The Ninth Circuit

Although more circuits have decided in favor of state law rather
than a federal common law, arguments are fairly consistent among the
circuits.122 Among the circuits in support of state law is the Ninth
Circuit, which, in a 1997 opinion, switched from supporting federal
common law to adopting state law.123 In Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., the plaintiff railroad company leased
property to the defendant agricultural chemical business.124 The EPA
ordered the defendant to clean-up contamination found on the
property.125 After learning that the defendant could not clean up the site,
the EPA ordered the plaintiff to undertake clean up action.126 Having
Id. (“I see no necessity to create federal common law in this area to guard against the
risk that states will create safe havens for polluters.”).
122
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489 (11th Cir. 1996). The
Eleventh Circuit, following many of the same positions of its sister circuits supporting
application of state law, stated as follows:
Absent a showing that state partnership law is inadequate to achieve
the goals of CERCLA, “we discern no imperative need to develop a
general body of federal common law to decide cases such as this.”
....
. . . CERCLA does not require that federal law displace state laws
governing the liability of limited partners unless these laws permit
action prohibited by the Act, or unless “their application would be
inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action.” . . .
. . . Consequently federal law governing liability under CERCLA
should incorporate the applicable state law rule for determining when
a limited partner loses its limited liability status so as to become
accountable for the CERCLA liability of the partnership.
Id. at 1501–02 (citations omitted).
123
159 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 1997). The court opined:
PureGro, on the other hand, would have us reexamine existing Ninth
Circuit precedent in light of intervening Supreme Court decisions and
hold that there is no need for a federal common law of successor
liability under CERCLA, and that state law supplies the rule of
decision in this area. We have jurisdiction . . . and we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of PureGro.
Id. at 360.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 361 (“The Railroads sued PureGro as [Brown & Bryant’s] successor-in-interest,
seeking private cost recovery, contribution and declaratory relief under CERCLA and
numerous state claims.”); see also Dopf, supra note 32, at 184 (explaining that the Railroads
argued that PureGro was liable under two tests: the fraudulently entered transaction
exception and the mere substantial continuation exception).
121
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realized they could not afford the clean-up, the defendant decided to sell
his business to co-defendant PureGro.127 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of PureGro, ruling that it was not liable as a
successor-in-interest for clean-up actions, and the plaintiff appealed.128
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals began its discussion by noting
that since 1990, when it had supported a federal rule in Louisiana-Pacific
Corp. v. Asarco, Inc.,129 the Supreme Court has decided that the instances
for creating federal rules are “few and restricted[.]”130 In Atchison, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals then explained that even where a federal
statute is involved, federal courts should not always fashion a federal
rule, especially when the application of state law will satisfy the purpose
of the federal statute.131 Finally, considering that the formation of
corporations and corporate liability are normally matters of state law, the
court applied the Kimbell test and concluded that the application of state
law is appropriate.132 Applying California State law, the court held that
PureGro was not liable under the “mere continuation” test.133

Atchison, 159 F.3d at 360.
Paying the appraised value for the equipment, PureGro bought half of
B & B’s equipment pursuant to an Equipment Sale Agreement. The
agreement specified that it was not to be construed as a purchase of B
& B’s business and that PureGro would not be considered de jure or de
facto a successor to B & B.
Id. The agreement also contained indemnity provisions that conditioned the purchase on
absolving PureGro of any environmental liability. Id.
128
Id. at 360. (“In this appeal, the Railroads ask us to exercise our powers under federal
common law to expand successor corporate liability under CERCLA.”).
129
909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990).
130
Atchison, 159 F.3d at 362. (explaining that the Supreme “Court rejected many of the
very arguments that La.-Pac. accepted in deciding CERCLA necessitated a set of uniform
federal rules for successor liability”).
131
Id. The court noted, “O’Melveny tells us that when dealing with a ‘comprehensive and
detailed’ federal statutory regulation, a court should instead presume that matters left
unaddressed in such a scheme are subject to state law.” Id.; see also Dopf, supra note 32, at
194.
132
See Atchison, 159 F.3d at 363. The court reasoned as follows:
“[T]o invoke the concept of ‘uniformity’ . . . is not to prove its need.”
Although often invoked in this context, there has been no real
explanation of the need for uniformity in the particular area of
successor liability—especially since state law will in many other
instances determine whom the EPA may or may not look to for
compensation. If state law varied widely on the issue of successor
liability, perhaps the need for a uniform federal rule would be more
apparent. This is not the case, however, as ‘the law in the fifty states
on corporate dissolution and successor liability is largely uniform.’
The argued “need” for uniformity thus stems not from disarray among
the various states, but from the alleged need for a more expansive
view of successor liability than state law currently provides—in other
127
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No matter which law is chosen to govern in this realm, CERCLA’s
legislative history makes clear that Congress’s primary concern was not
disruption of state law, but the threats to human health and the
environment created by hazardous waste.134
III. ANALYSIS: WHETHER TO ADOPT STATE LAW OR FEDERAL LAW TO
DECIDE THE ISSUE OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
Arguably, CERCLA is an example of legislation enacted hastily to
combat a serious matter of public concern; it contains gaps and defects,
as is reflected in the issue of successor liability.135 In 1944, the Supreme
Court held that, in the context of limited liability, federal statutes are
preferable to state common law rules.136 As a result, some commentators
words, the notion that state law on this issue is inadequate for
CERCLA’s purposes.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Dopf, supra note 32, at 190. Dopf agreed with
the Ninth Circuit’s holding that state law appropriately provides the applicable rule for
successor liability. Dopf, supra note 32, at 190. Dopf further argued that although
legislative history supports the adoption of a uniform rule, Congress has never hinted that
state corporation law should be displaced. Id. at 192. Citing CERCLA’s sponsor’s
advocacy of adopting a uniform rule, the author contends that the personal conclusions of
one member of Congress cannot outweigh the absence of support for a uniform rule in
CERCLA’s text or relevant committee reports. Id. 192–93.
133
Atchison, 159 F.3d at 364. Applauding the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Atchison, one
author provided the following explanation:
The application of existing state law is preferable to the creation of new
federal common law. State law, which has evolved over many years is
frequently codified in statutes, is well developed and can be easily
discoverable and applicable. In contrast, “the creation of new federal
common law is a difficult, open-ended, and long term task.” If courts
were to begin creating new federal common law, they would bear the
burden of fashioning rules appropriate to the circumstances that each
element of corporation law would bring with it.
Dopf, supra note 32, at 199 (footnotes omitted).
134
See Clarke, supra note 32, at 1313. Clarke also noted:
Even if a uniform federal rule of successor liability had a greater effect
on the business community than expected, CERCLA’s legislative
history reveals that Congress was far more concerned with the
substantial threats to human health and the environment posed by the
national hazardous waste disposal problem than it was with
disrupting commercial relationships based on state law.
Id.
135
See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text (discussing the reasons for, and
consequences of, CERCLA’s hasty enactment, the resultant statutory deficiencies, and the
judicial system’s efforts to resolve issues created by the Act’s deficiencies).
136
Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 14, at 452 n.142. The authors quote Anderson v.
Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 365 (1944): “no State may endow its corporate creatures with the
power to place themselves above the Congress of the United States and defeat the federal
policy . . . which Congress has announced.” Id.
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propose that federal courts now have the responsibility to fashion
uniform rules that pierce the corporate veil in order to identify liable
parties and achieve the specific purposes of the federal statute.137 To the
contrary, some scholars maintain that CERCLA’s silence on the matter
supports the application of state law, and thereby respects the
philosophy of federalism.138 Indeed, many arguments have been raised
to potentially resolve the issue, and some are more persuasive than
others.139 Unfortunately, however, neither Congress nor the Supreme
Court has adopted an argument that might potentially quiet the twentyeight-year-young controversy.140
In Kimbell, the Supreme Court noted that judicial policy, viewed in
light of three different factors, would guide courts when deciding
whether to fashion a nationwide federal law.141 These factors include
whether a need for uniformity exists, whether the application of state
law would disrupt the specific purposes of the federal law or program,
and whether the adoption of a federal rule would frustrate commercial
relationships rooted in state law.142 This test has been used in a vast
number of cases, dealing with a variety of legal issues.143 Consequently,
Part III of this Note will analyze the successor liability problem under
CERCLA using the framework and factors outlined by the Supreme
Court in Kimbell.

Id. But see Warren, supra note 3, at 326.
Warren, supra note 3, at 326. The author stated:
State law could be fashioned to favor corporations by allowing them to
escape liability as successors under CERCLA, or it could give
preference to environmental concerns and promulgate successor
liability standards that are tough on corporations. Regardless, many
people argue that CERCLA’s silence on the issue necessitates deference
to state law.
Id. (footnote omitted).
139
See supra Parts II.D–E. (discussing the various arguments for the adoption of federal
law and those for the application of state law to resolve the issue of successor liability).
140
See infra Parts IV.A–C (explaining ways in which Congress or the Supreme Court
could resolve the issue of successor liability).
141
See supra notes 55–62 and accompanying text (discussing the Kimbell factors and their
wide application to different areas of the law, and also explaining how the Kimbell factors
are applied to facts to decide when federal common law should be created and when state
law should govern an issue).
142
See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text (elaborating on the application of these
factors to legal issues, and explaining what consequences each factor is designed to
measure).
143
See supra note 58 (noting the wide array of cases and legal issues to which the Kimbell
test has been applied).
137
138
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A. Is There a Need for a Federal Uniform Definition of Successor Liability?
One of the difficulties that many courts face when confronted with
issues of statutory construction is deciding what Congress would do, or,
in the alternative, deciding that Congress left it solely to the courts to
resolve the specific issue.144 The Supreme Court, however, is reluctant to
fashion federal rules to fill gaps in federal statutes.145 In the context of
successor liability, a judicial and scholarly debate has continued for more
than twenty years on this very issue. In Kimbell, when discussing
whether uniformity in the administration of a federal program is
necessary, the Supreme Court suggested that for uniformity to be
essential, the federal program or Act by its very nature must necessitate
the creation of uniform rules.146 An additional question to consider is
whether state law inadequately resolves the question of successor
liability, thereby necessitating the creation of federal law.147
Perhaps the strongest argument for creating a federal uniform law in
this area is Congress’s goal to expedite the litigation of successor liability
issues.148 In the absence of a uniform federal rule, litigants, attorneys,
and judges might spend needless resources in resolving liability cases.149
One goal of CERCLA is to minimize litigation and transaction costs, and
some circuits have held that this goal is served marginally by a state-bystate, or case-by-case, approach to determine which law should apply.150
144
United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2005). In this case, the
Third Circuit took the latter approach in holding that Congress expected courts to resolve
the issue by fashioning a federal common law that answered successor liability issues. Id.
In Smithland, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained that a general common law
doctrine of successor liability administered in most states should be adopted by courts
rather than specific statutes that apply in a few states. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v.
Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91–92 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991) (“a federal court . . . must find . . . that
Congress painted with a broad brush and left it to the courts to ‘flesh out’ the statute by
fashioning a body of substantive federal law[] . . . .”).
145
See supra text accompanying notes 77–78 (discussing the Supreme Court’s caution that
controversies involving federal programs do not always require the adoption of uniform
federal rules).
146
United States v. Kimbell, 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979).
147
See supra notes 118, 121 and accompanying text (quoting the analysis of the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals of when it is appropriate to apply state law instead of fashioning
federal common law).
148
See supra notes 21, 36–37, 89 and accompanying text (considering the amount of
litigation spawned by CERCLA’s absence of how to resolve successor liability issues, and
also arguing that a case-by-case approach to resolve the issue in each state would only
increase the amount of litigation and circumvent CERCLA’s goals).
149
See supra notes 21, 36 and accompanying text (supporting the notion that CERCLA’s
silence on the issue of successor liability has led to incalculable amounts of litigation).
150
See supra note 89 and accompanying text (arguing that a case-by-case approach to
resolving the issue in each state would only increase the amount of litigation and fail to
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The creation of a uniform law would avoid this often lengthy process of
parties arguing over which law governs and would allow parties to
spend time litigating the more important issue: who is the appropriate
successor in interest.151 Because the Supreme Court is weary of
fashioning new common law, an alternative approach might be for the
Court to use its interpretive power under Marbury v. Madison, and to
hold that Congress intended successor liability be enforced under state
law.152 Without considering possible consequences, this approach
arguably would avoid the litigation costs and judicial resources currently
used to decide whether state or federal law should apply.153
On the contrary, a federal common law rule may not be necessary
because in most cases, state law adequately determines whom the EPA
can pursue for compensation, and, as a result, state law achieves
CERCLA’s purpose of identifying liable parties.154 Furthermore, state
law does not vary widely on matters of corporate dissolution and
successor liability; consequently, there is no real need to fashion a law
that brings all the states into conformity with one another.155 In
satisfy CERCLA’s goals); see also United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d 294, 300
(3d Cir. 2005) (“Applying a particular state’s law requires a state-by-state interpretation of
the federal liability statute—a result, in the case of successor liability under CERCLA, that
we believe conflicts with the statutory objectives.”).
151
See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text (explaining that CERCLA’s primary goal
is to remediate contaminated sites promptly).
152
See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (explaining that CERCLA’s silence on
the issue manifests an intent to have liable successors determined by the application of
relevant state law). But see supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (contending that the
right to construe a statute is different than the authority to fashion new laws).
153
But see Smolen, supra note 83, at 148–49.
[T]he Third Circuit held that applying state successor liability
standards would lead to increases in both the amount of litigation
brought under CERCLA and transaction costs. Moreover, applying
state law conflicts with the dual policy reasons behind the passage [of]
CERCLA [] encouraging both early settlement of lawsuits and
redevelopment of previously contaminated land.
Id. (footnote omitted).
154
See supra note 132 and accompanying text (arguing that state law furnishes the
necessary standards to determine who the EPA may consider for compensation of clean-up
costs, thereby satisfying CERCLA’s objectives).
But see supra notes 88–89 and
accompanying text (arguing that state law inadequately satisfies CERCLA’s objectives of a
liquid market in brownfield assets by creating an unpredictable case-by-case approach to
successor liability. Instead, it is contended that a uniform and predictable federal standard
comports with CERCLA’s objective of creating a liquid market in brownfield assets).
155
See supra note 132 (suggesting that because state law does not vary widely on issues of
successor liability, there is no need for national uniformity); see also Dennis, supra note 50,
at 1451 (explaining that laws which govern the piercing of the corporate veil do vary
among the states). But see United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., Inc., 423 F.3d 294, 301 (3d
Cir. 2005) (arguing that although state law does not vary widely on the issue, and although
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summation, the argument is that fashioning a federal law would not
substantially affect the current process and laws that govern successor
liability; and, therefore, no real need exists for a federal law in this
instance.156
As is apparent, the first prong of the Kimbell test is a difficult hurdle
over which to leap for those in favor of national uniformity in this area.
The “need” articulated by the Kimbell court creates a high standard that
must be met in order to persuade the court to fashion federal common
law.157 Therefore, the question may be limited to a consideration of
whether minimizing litigation costs and judicial time meets the
“necessary” standard articulated in Kimbell.158 However, a further
question to consider is whether, even if these considerations (minimizing
litigation costs and judicial time) create a need for federal uniformity and
the statute is nonetheless judicially construed to apply state law, would
the need be an imagined phenomenon swallowed up by the interests of
federalism?159 In contrast, would a decision to adopt a federal standard
merely be an exercise of filling definitional gaps (“successor
corporation”) in a hastily enacted statute, rather than the “free-wheeling
creation of federal common law[?]”160 Additionally, even if a need for
successor liability involves aspects of tort and corporate law, both of which are generally
matters of state law, the seeming state-by-state uniformity is less apparent when applied to
specific cases). Id. The Third Circuit also cited several examples of how small and subtle
legal nuances on successor liability issues create differences when applied in different
states: New York and other states emphasize “continuity of ownership” as a factor of
successor liability, while other states do not; some states, including Pennsylvania and New
Jersey, apply unique successor liability doctrines in environmental cases, while other states
do not; in some states, the rules governing liability are ambiguous and are not applied
uniformly; and, finally, even states and jurisdictions that generally agree on which legal
doctrines are appropriate to apply, administer them differently. Id. at 301–02 n.6.
156
See supra notes 118–21, 131 and accompanying text (contending that the instances are
few and restricted in which federal law should be created and applied, and state law
adequately resolves the issue of successor liability, thereby quashing the need for federal
uniformity that some courts argue is mandated in the realm of successor liability under
CERCLA). But see United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
Supporting the creation of federal law, the court held that federal law should be created in
order for the issue of successor liability to be resolved meeting CERCLA’s objectives. Id.
The court reasoned that the application of the state standards might not preclude further
litigation on the issue, and the possibility of different state standards might lead to
inconsistent results. Id.
157
See supra notes 141–43 (reviewing some of the standards considered in determining
whether the creation of a federal law is necessary).
158
See supra note 122 (explaining that CERCLA does not require application of federal
law unless state law would be inconsistent with CERCLA’s stated purposes).
159
See Warren, supra note 3, at 326 (supporting the idea that arguments in favor of the
application of state law have their roots in federalism).
160
United States v. Gen. Battery Corp., 423 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that
recent Supreme Court cases have not filled in gaps of federal liability statutes with the law
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federal uniformity exists, a final inquiry becomes whether the
application of state law sufficiently resolves the need.161
B. Would the Application of State Law Disrupt the Specific Purposes of
CERCLA?
As discussed in Part II.A, Congress had the following two purposes
in enacting CERCLA: 1) to allow the EPA to quickly pursue recovery
costs from parties liable for clean-up activities at a hazardous site; and 2)
to identify and actually remediate contaminated sites.162 CERCLA’s
legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended for its purposes
to be fulfilled promptly by cleaning up hazardous waste sites quickly.163
One author argues that CERCLA is a remediation statute intended to
impose liability on parties for past actions that have caused present
consequences.164 Therefore, the ultimate decision to apply state or
federal law must consider these purposes and not prohibit them from
prompt accomplishment.165
Proponents of state law argue that CERCLA’s purposes are
accomplished by the application of state law: a liable party can be
identified through the application of state corporate liability laws.166
However, the concern remains as to whether state law will continue to
satisfy CERLCA’s purposes.167
of an individual state; rather, the Court has filled the statutory gaps with general common
law principles); supra notes 77, 135 (emphasizing the statutory gaps present in CERCLA).
161
See supra Part III.A (discussing whether the application of State Law to resolve the
issue of successor liability satisfies CERCLA’s specific objectives).
162
See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text (citing the purposes and Congressional
intent for enacting CERCLA).
163
See supra note 29 and accompanying text (emphasizing that CERCLA was enacted to
combat the growing concerns over the environmental and health risks created by the
disposal of hazardous waste and that Congress intended to have hazardous waste sites
promptly remediated).
164
See supra note 17 and accompanying text (citing one author who explained CERCLA,
as a backward-looking Act, and seeking to remediate past events of contamination that
have created present consequences).
165
See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (discussing the Kimbell factors and their
utility in deciding whether state or federal law would meet a federal policy’s objectives); see
also Clarke, supra note 32, at 1312 (“‘One can hardly imagine a federal program more
demanding of national uniformity than environmental protection.’ . . . [U]niform
enforcement of CERCLA is especially necessary because hazardous sites often present
problems and dangers that cross state lines and demand remedial attention at the federal
level.”) (footnote omitted).
166
See supra note 111 and accompanying text (citing an example of how state corporate
liability laws can be used to find responsible parties in successor liability cases under
CERCLA, and arguing that state liability laws are largely uniform among the fifty states).
167
See supra note 59 and accompanying text (citing one instance where state law is
inadequate to resolve issues of successor liability).
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The legislative history and the holdings of several circuits reflect that
CERCLA’s purposes would not be fulfilled in the absence of federal
uniformity, reasoning that such silence in this area could lead to states
creating more lenient laws to attract business, and consequently, could
create a “race to the bottom” for states and a “safe haven” for
polluters.168 More specifically, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reasoned that CERCLA’s purposes and goals could be subverted by a
liable party’s decision to merge under the laws of states that restrict the
possibility of successor liability.169
In contrast to this view, circuits opposed to a federal law in this area
generally reason that a “race to the bottom” will not result and that
different states will not create “safe havens.”170 This view is supported
by the fact that presently no state law can genuinely be characterized as
creating a safe haven.171 Additionally, it is argued that all states have
their own interest in being certain that successor corporations do not
avoid successor liability.172 Furthermore, many states have agencies

See supra notes 67, 76, 116, 120–21 and accompanying text (arguing that federal
uniformity comports with Congress’s desire to prohibit polluters from establishing their
operations in states that have more lenient liability laws). See also Clarke, supra note 32, at
1312–13. Clarke stated:
Several courts finding a need for uniform enforcement of
CERCLA have noted that an important consideration leading to
[CERCLA’s] enactment was the failure of the states to respond
adequately to hazardous waste problems[] . . . [and]
. . . that district courts “must consider national uniformity” to
prevent the unduly restrictive successor liability laws of particular
states from frustrating CERCLA’s goals.
Id. (footnote omitted).
169
See supra note 80 and accompanying text (citing Smithland, where the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a federal uniform standard should be adopted to prevent
CERCLA’s objectives from being circumvented by a party choosing to merge or
incorporate in a state with laws that unnecessarily restrict successor liability).
170
See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text (arguing that creation of a “race to the
bottom” or “safe havens” is not a valid concern because states have an interest in
protecting human health and the environment).
171
See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 364
(9th Cir. 1997); see also Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1502
(11th Cir. 1996).
172
See Atchison, 159 F.3d at 364. See also Redwing Carriers, Inc., 94 F.3d at 1502, stating:
States have a substantial interest in protecting their citizens and state
resources. Most states have their own counterparts to CERCLA and
the EPA and they share a complementary interest with the United
States in enforcement of laws like CERCLA that are used to remedy
environmental contamination. I see no necessity to create federal
common law in this area, to guard against the risk that states will
create safe havens.
Id. (quoting Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991)).
168
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analogous to the EPA that are authorized to deal with hazardous waste
sites, which further ensures that a race to the bottom is not as inevitable
as some might suppose.173 Therefore, the notion is that cleaning up
hazardous waste sites is not a unique federal interest, and states have
quieted any perceived need for federal uniformity by creating state
agencies that promote remedial efforts to clean up hazardous waste
sites.174
One additional objective of CERCLA, however, is to facilitate a more
liquid market in “brownfield” assets.175 Some proponents of a federal
law have urged that this purpose is best served by uniform and
predictable standards and that unpredictability as to which law to apply
would only complicate and increase the costs of “brownfield”
transactions.176 In sum, a uniform law in this area could give to
corporations and investors, purchasing a property that potentially
contains hazardous waste, security as to which law will apply if waste is
found and liability is investigated.177
Having considered the need for federal uniformity and whether state
law can satisfy any need for uniformity, the final inquiry is whether a
federal rule would frustrate corporate relationships.178
C. Would the Adoption of a Federal Rule Frustrate Commercial Relationships
Established Under State Law?
This is a difficult inquiry because the “consequences of the rule and
the degree of disruption, if any, would depend on the substantive
content of the rule, not on its mere existence.”179 Although some courts
See id.
Id.; see also Dennis, supra note 50, at 1501–02 (“Claims that adoption of state law would
lead to the creation of “safe havens for polluters and would quickly exhaust the Superfund
were shown to be too speculative to meet the evidentiary standards established in other
cases.”).
175
See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing that a uniform federal rule would
help facilitate Congress’s economic interest in creating a more liquid market in
“brownfield” assets).
176
See supra note 88 (discussing that some of the statutory objectives of CERCLA are to
encourage the clean-up, transfer, and redevelopment of contaminated sites); see also Polius
v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 83 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Unforeseeable alterations in successor
liability principles complicate transfers and necessarily increases [sic] transaction costs.
Major economic decisions, critical to society, are best made in a climate of relative certainty
and reasonable predictability.”) (citation omitted).
177
But see Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1502 (11th Cir.
1996) (explaining that due to the popularity of limited partnerships, investors’ expectations
may be upset by the adoption of a federal rule).
178
See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing whether the adoption of a federal rule would frustrate
commercial relationships created under state law).
179
See Clarke, supra note 32, at 1313. But see id.
173
174
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have held that this factor supports the adoption of state law, many have
failed to address extensively its implications when applied to the
successor liability problem.180
One author commented that the
application of a state’s law of incorporation to external issues could
result in difficult problems, such as if a case involved several
corporations incorporated in different states.181
Under these
circumstances, a corporation has no guarantee that the successor liability
laws in its state of incorporation will govern successor liability issues—a
guarantee and predictability that any corporation is entitled to and
would receive with a federal standard.182 In addition to concerns about
lack of predictability, outside of the CERCLA issue, some courts have
held that the frustration of commercial relationships based on state law
may result in a variety of ways.183
This discussion will be considered in light of three factors considered
by some courts.184 First, Part III.C.1 discusses whether commercial
relationships are disrupted when a corporation anticipated that an issue
was to be governed by state law.185 Second, Part III.C.2 analyzes whether
disruption of commercial relationships will result once a federal
standard has been widely applied.186 Third, Part III.C.3 considers
whether commercial relationships would be disrupted by the
uncertainty that newly fashioned federal common law creates.187
Even if a uniform federal rule of successor liability had a greater effect
on the business community than expected, CERCLA’s legislative
history reveals that Congress was far more concerned with the
substantial threats to human health and the environment posed by the
national hazardous waste disposal problem than it was with
disrupting commercial relationships based on state law.
Id.
See generally Redwing Carriers, Inc., 94 F.3d at 1502 (arguing that creation of a federal
law would frustrate “the expectations investors have under current state law rules . . . .”).
181
Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law,
95 HARV. L. REV. 853, 863 (1982); see also supra note 136 (explaining why some problems
exist when CERCLA issues cross state-lines).
182
Dennis, supra note 50, at 1502–03.
183
See supra note 58 (discussing three ways that courts have held that frustration of
commercial relationships based on state law can result).
184
The questions and cases discussed in this Part were first considered in Dennis, supra
note 50.
185
See infra notes 187–91 and accompanying text (discussing and applying a choice-oflaw Supreme Court case that considered whether commercial relationships are disrupted
when an entity anticipated that an issue was to be governed by state law).
186
See infra notes 192–97 and accompanying text (considering and applying a choice-oflaw Ninth Circuit case to the question of whether disruption of commercial relationships
will result when a federal law has been widely applied).
187
See infra notes 198–201 and accompanying text (discussing and applying a Ninth
Circuit case to the present issue of successor liability in the context of whether commercial
180
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Are Commercial Relationships Disrupted When a Corporation
Anticipated That an Issue Was To Be Governed by State Law?

First, courts have considered the disruption of commercial
relationships in actions taken before the adoption of a federal rule when
a corporation has anticipated that the issue would be handled by state
law.188 For example, the Supreme Court in United States v. Brosnan
refused to create a federal rule dealing with federal tax liens being
nullified in the foreclosure proceedings of a particular state.189 The Court
reasoned that although uniformity could be beneficial to the federal
government, allowing state law to govern foreclosure proceedings
would be more consistent with Congress’s previous actions.190
As applied to the issue at hand, if a federal law governing successor
liability was created, an investor, stockholder, or corporation who
invested in a corporate body or transaction before the federal law was
created would not have had the opportunity to contemplate his potential
liability under the federal law.191 In short, an investor or parent
corporation might be held liable unfairly if a federal standard is different
than the standard contemplated when the investment was made.192
2.

Will Disruption of Commercial Relationships Result Once a Federal
Standard Has Been Widely Applied?

Second, courts have considered the disruption of commercial
relationships that might result from the effects the rule will have after it
becomes well-known and widely applied.193 For example, in United
States v. Hadden Haciendas Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals created
a federal rule that permitted post-foreclosure actions for damages.194 The
relationships would be disrupted by the resultant uncertainty that a new federal law would
create).
188
Dennis, supra note 50, at 1503.
189
363 U.S. 237, 241–42 (1960). See also Dennis, supra note 50, at 1503. Dennis noted that
the Kimbell Court cited Brosnan as just one authority for the third factor in the Kimbell test.
Id.; see United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729 n.24 (1979).
190
Brosnan, 363 U.S. at 242. Additionally, the Court gave the following reasons for
choosing to adopt state law: “Long accepted nonjudicial means of enforcing private liens
would be embarrassed[] . . . and many titles already secured by such means would be cast
in doubt.” Id.; see also Dennis, supra note 50, at 1503.
191
Dennis, supra note 50, at 1506. The author also argues that “creditors who finance a
parent corporation will now have to concern themselves with the parent’s liability for
damages incurred by the subsidiary.” Id. at 1507.
192
Id. This represents an unforeseen risk that the creditor did not have to consider when
she originally financed the parent corporation. Id. at 1507.
193
Id. at 1504.
194
541 F.2d 777, 785 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Dennis, supra note 50, at 1504 n.592.
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court reasoned that the federal law did not overly intrude on state laws
protecting debtors because the necessary protection contemplated by
state statutes would be achieved by application of a federal rule and the
federal program.195
In the context of successor liability, a uniform rule would help serve
CERCLA’s remedial purposes of identifying potentially liable parties
and increasing the liquid market in “brownfield” assets.196 In the long
run, this would benefit both states and individuals by allowing them to
predict how liable parties will be identified, and it might also increase
the rate at which hazardous property is cleaned up, redeveloped, or
transferred.197 However, although the creation of federal law might meet
states’ and CERCLA’s expectations in cleaning up hazardous waste, no
specific federal policy would be compromised by applying the laws of
the individual states.198
3.

Would Commercial Relationships Be Disrupted By the Uncertainty
Newly Fashioned Federal Common Law Creates?

Third, courts have considered the uncertainty caused by the
adoption and application of a new federal law.199 For example, in 1986
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals articulated two concerns that a
federal rule might present to litigants applying a newly fashioned federal
law. The concern most relevant to the issue of successor liability is
whether the application of a new federal rule—in place of applying a
fully defined and established state law—could create uncertainty about
how the rule is applied in a specific set of circumstances.200
In CERCLA’s world of successor liability, the confusion will most
likely be temporary while federal courts try to apply the new federal
law.201 Although some argue that creation of a federal law will bring
Hadden Haciendas, 541 F.2d at 785.
See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (explaining how a federal rule would
help facilitate a more liquid market in brownfield assets, and thereby satisfy CERCLA and
its amendment’s purposes).
197
See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing the objectives of the 2001
Amendments to CERCLA and the relevance of “brownfield” assets, and explaining that
one of CERCLA’s goals is to reduce litigation and transaction costs).
198
See supra notes 122,153 and accompanying text (explaining that no federal policy
would be compromised by the application of state law). But see supra note 89 (arguing that
CERCLA’s objectives of lowering litigation costs is poorly served by a case-by-case
approach to the question of successor liability); note 67 (arguing that more lenient state
laws would disrupt the federal policy behind enacting CERCLA).
199
Dennis, supra note 50, at 1505.
200
See id. at 1505–06 (citing Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1460 (9th
Cir. 1986)).
201
Id. at 1510–11.
195
196
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predictability to the realm of successor liability, others maintain that the
confusion will only start anew and continue until a large enough body of
case law exists such that litigants can predict confidently how a federal
court will apply the law to a particular set of circumstances.202 In
addition to these concerns and approaches, other concerns and
arguments remain as to which law should apply.
IV. A NEED FOR UNIFORMITY
The arguments both for application of state law and those for
application of federal law are persuasive.203 And yet, need for national
uniformity is apparent from the declared purposes of CERCLA and in
order to avoid the continued confusion and unpredictability that
differences in state law create.204 Therefore, this Note proposes that the
confusion must be alleviated in one of three ways.205 First, Congress
could resolve the issue through a statutory amendment that clearly states
how a successor corporation is to be determined for purposes of
liability.206 Second, if the Supreme Court determines that Congress will
continue to remain silent, it could use its authority to construe the Act
and clearly define what Congress intended a “corporation” to mean.207
Finally, if it is apparent that mere statutory construction will
inadequately resolve the issue, uniform federal common law should be
created to clearly outline how a successor corporation is to be
determined.208

202
See supra notes 88 and 176 and accompanying text (explaining that predictability is a
desirable trait of a federal law in this area). But see Dennis, supra note 50, at 1510–11
(discussing the temporary confusion that will continue to plague corporations and
investors if a federal law is adopted).
203
See supra Parts II.D–III (discussing the histories and arguments for application of state
law and application of federal law).
204
See supra Part III (analyzing the various arguments for application of state law and
federal law, and considering the reasons why fashioning a federal rule in the realm of
successor liability is superior to the case-by-case approach of applying state law).
205
See infra Part IV.B. Mere statutory construction can be difficult to separate fully from
the fashioning of federal common law in the realm of successor liability due to the specific
language that must be included to define how a successor corporation is to be determined
under CERCLA. See infra Part IV.B.
206
See infra Part IV.A (proposing a statutory amendment to define how a successor
corporation is to be determined under CERCLA, and considering how such an amendment
would resolve the issue of successor liability).
207
See infra Part IV.B (proposing statutory construction as an option to resolving the issue
of successor liability).
208
See infra Part IV.C (proposing that the Supreme Court resolve the issue by creating a
uniform approach to determining who is a successor corporation under CERCLA).
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A. Proposed Amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 9607 of CERCLA
Congress could amend section 9607 of CERCLA to define
“corporation” as follows:
(5) For purposes of liability, “any person” as used in this
section includes successors to any corporate entity that is
subject to liability. Where the facts are in dispute as to
whether a corporation is truly a successor to a liable party, a
“successor corporation” shall be determined by the following
factors: “(1) retention of the same employees [by the
buyer]; (2) retention of the same supervisory personnel;
(3) retention of the same production facilities in the same
location; (4) production of the same product; (5)
retention of the same name; (6) continuity of assets; (7)
continuity of general business operations; and (8)
whether the buyer holds itself out as a continuation of
the” divesting corporation.209
Commentary
This problem that could easily be fixed if Congress decided to
resolve the issue and amend CERCLA to state clearly which law should
govern or, alternatively, to indicate clearly how “person” is to be defined
under the courts’ term “successor corporation.”210 Unfortunately,
however, CERCLA was enacted in 1980, and its progeny—the 1986 and
2000 Amendments—were silent as to the issue of successor liability.
Consequently, if the issue is to be resolved, the Court should assume the
responsibility because Congress has had nearly twenty-eight years to
amend CERCLA with a clear definition of “successor corporation,” but
has failed to do so. Obviously, this is the fastest and, arguably, the least
controversial method of resolving the conflict. However, in summary,
absent any indication that an amendment to CERCLA is forthcoming,
the Court should assume the responsibility of resolving the issue.
B. Supreme Court Construction of “Successor Corporation”
The Supreme Court could construe CERCLA to define how a
“successor corporation” is to be determined:
209
The text appearing in normal font represents language taken from the First Circuit’s
opinion in United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 53 (1st Cir. 2001). The text appearing in italics
represents the proposed amendment of the author of this Note.
210
See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text (explaining that although Congress did
not include “successor corporation” in the definition of “person,” federal circuit courts
have interpreted “corporation” to include “successor corporation”).
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Corporation[s],” included under 42 U.S.C. § 9601, which are
liable for clean-up costs of contaminated sites, include the
following: the current owner of a site on which remedial
action is necessary when a responsible party cannot be found
and the owner of a site at the time the hazardous waste
was disposed of. Additionally, where the responsible party
is a defunct corporation, the Act is interpreted to include any
“corporation” that is a successor-in-interest, successor-inbusiness, or successor-in-assets to the defunct corporation.211
Commentary
This proposed judicial construction might alleviate some of the
confusion in determining who a successor corporation is. Unfortunately,
this interpretation may be too ambiguous to give courts enough
direction when determining successor corporations in every instance.
Additionally, a larger difficulty remains with the premise that the
Court’s authority to construe a statute is very different than its authority
to create a new federal rule.212 Some commentators have argued that the
Court could easily define “successor corporation” without creating
federal common law.213 However, if federal courts are to define
“successor corporation” rather than apply state law or create common
law, the holding must not be so broad that it abuses the courts power to
construe statutes by creating definitions that are in themselves whole
new laws.
Therefore, under the separation of powers doctrine, while statutory
construction might be more acceptable than fashioning federal common
law, any definition might be too narrow and leave continued ambiguity
causing parties to litigate, thereby violating one of CERCLA’s purposes
that an amendment or interpretation is meant to correct—reducing
litigation costs. In short, an acceptable interpretation to resolve the issue
may be too broad to simply be characterized as construing CERCLA.

211
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2000). The text appearing in normal font represents language that
was adapted from dicta in the Third Circuit’s opinion Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v.
Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1988). The text appearing in italics represents the
proposed interpretation of the author of this Note.
212
See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between
statutory construction and the creation of federal rules).
213
See supra text accompanying note 87 (citing the Third Circuit’s holding that creation of
a federal rule would constitute statutory interpretation and not the creation of federal
common law).
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C. Judicially Created Common Law Defining “Sucessor Corporation”
The Supreme Court could create federal common law that clearly
defines how a “successor corporation” is to be determined:
The circuit courts in favor of federal common law have
adopted the “substantial continuation” test as the appropriate
uniform federal standard. After concluding that adoption of a
uniform federal standard is what Congress intended, we see no
reason why the “substantial continuation” test should not be
adopted as that standard. As such, when determining whether
a corporation is liable as a successor in liability for clean-up
costs on a contaminated waste site, courts should analyze the
facts in light of the following eight factors: “(1) retention of
the same employees [by the buyer]; (2) retention of the
same supervisory personnel; (3) retention of the same
production facilities in the same location; (4) production
of the same product; (5) retention of the same name; (6)
continuity of assets; (7) continuity of general business
operations; and (8) whether the buyer holds itself out as
a continuation of the” divesting corporation.214
Commentary
Although this might be the least favorable alternative, it is probably
the most likely and reasonable. The “substantial continuation” test has
been applied in many cases already. Therefore, fears that a new
common law would only create confusion of application until a large
number of cases have been decided are somewhat unfounded.
Furthermore, determining successor corporations can require an
extremely fact-sensitive analysis. Therefore, the proposed test gives
courts the ability to analyze cases consistently, based on a variety of
factors, and in spite of varying facts.
Additionally, as previously discussed, the stated purposes of
CERCLA are to promptly pursue recovery costs, to identify and
remediate contaminated sites, and to minimize litigation and transaction
costs in identifying potentially responsible parties.215 Also, CERCLA’s
sponsor indicated that one of its primary purposes is to ensure the
creation of a uniform rule of law to mitigate the possibility of businesses
214
The text appearing in normal font represents language taken from the First Circuit’s
opinion in United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 53 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The text
appearing in italics represents the proposed judicial holding of the author of this Note.
215
See generally supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes for
which CERCLA was enacted).
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locating in states that are “safe havens” for pollution.216 In consideration
of these purposes, the benefits of the proposed uniform test become even
more apparent.217
V. CONCLUSION
Although the application of State X’s or State Y’s law might be able
to resolve the hypothetical presented in Part I of this Note, the adequacy
of their ability to also meet CERCLA’s specific objectives is questionable.
Additionally, the difference in corporate liability laws between State X
(more lenient laws) and State Y (more strict laws) creates an additional
hurdle for the federal court to consider when deciding which law should
govern the issue. Indeed, the creation of a federal rule as discussed in
Part IV has a greater likelihood of satisfying CERCLA’s various purposes
while also giving the federal court in the hypothetical in Part I a uniform,
widely applied, and predictable approach to determining whether E
Corp. is a successor in interest. Furthermore, a uniform rule would allow
E Corp. and the government to avoid the unnecessary cost of litigating to
determine which law should apply in a specific scenario: federal law,
State X’s law, or State Y’s law. The result of adopting a uniform standard
is that the federal court would be emboldened to resolve hastily the
greatest issue: who will pay for the clean-up costs of the contaminated
facilities?
The different approaches to adopting a federal rule introduced in
Part IV of this Note would each have a greater likelihood of resolving
who is liable in a successor liability case. Specifically, the second
approach in Part IV.B, which advocates statutory construction, is less
likely to resolve the issue because further ambiguity would remain as to
how a successor is to be determined. Alternatively, the first and third
approaches in Parts IV.A and IV.C clearly define factors to consider
when determining who is a liable successor to contaminated property.
However, this being the case, any of the three approaches discussed in
Part IV would resolve issues of never-ending litigation to determine
which law is the applicable standard. Specifically, each approach as
applied to the hypothetical would eliminate litigation to decide which
law applies, and each party would arrive at the judge’s bench ready to
argue the facts as applied to a predictable standard, thereby expediting
the process of determining who is liable for cleaning up a contaminated
site—the ultimate purpose of CERCLA.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text (citing Representative Florio’s discussion of
CERCLA’s primary objectives).

216
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In summary, the predictability of a federal common law and the
ability of a uniform law to satisfy CERCLA’s objectives make it a superior
choice to the application of state law. Among the many stated reasons
for a uniform rule, analysis of the issue using the Kimbell test further
substantiates that uniform law is the appropriate choice.218 First, the
need for federal common law to resolve the issue is clear. The
application of state law would not encourage early settlement of
lawsuits, whereas uniformity would expedite the process because
litigation time would not be wasted in determining who is a “successor
corporation.” Additionally, state law would not facilitate the prompt
redevelopment of brownfield sites. Both of these reasons are purposes
for which CERCLA was enacted.
Second, state law would disrupt the specific purposes of CERCLA.
Application of state law could create a future “race to the bottom”
among states that create lenient laws to attract business.219 Additionally,
state law is often inadequate to address problems of hazardous waste
that cross state lines and require federal intervention for complete
resolution. Finally, state law could inhibit the prompt redevelopment of
brownfield sites, due to the unpredictability that corporations would
face in determining which law would govern if they were involved in a
lawsuit seeking to identify a potentially responsible party.
Third, a federal rule would not frustrate commercial relationships
founded upon state law. Any challenge that might be created would
only be temporary. Confusion would remain until a large enough body
of law existed such that corporations could predict how the courts would
apply the federal standard. Nevertheless, this temporary confusion is
preferable to the restrictive state laws that would alternatively govern
the issue and, consequently, frustrate CERCLA’s main goals.
A consideration of the issue under the Kimbell factors ensures that
creation of federal law to resolve the issue of successor liability has the
highest potential for meeting CERCLA’s objectives. Accordingly, federal

See supra Parts III.A–C (examining the Kimbell factors as applied to the issue of
successor liability under CERCLA to decide whether federal law should be adopted rather
applying state law).
219
See supra note 168 and accompanying text (arguing that CERCLA’s legislative history
and several circuits’ holdings reflect that the absence of federal uniformity would cause
states to enact more lenient laws to stimulate their economies).
218
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common law has the greatest possibility of remedying a deficiency in a
statute that could be resolved by the creation of a rule that is uniform
and predictable.
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